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 ABSTRACT  
 
 
This thesis critiques rightsizing policies in Baltimore, Maryland. It analyzes 
Project C.O.R.E. and the effect it will have on the neighborhood of Sandtown-
Winchester. This thesis argues that rightsizing policies have and will continue to have 
a negative impact on low-income, predominately African-American neighborhoods in 
the city by destroying the cultural and built environment and their historic resources. It 
asserts that rightsizing is a short-sighted public policy.  
The work argues this claim by first providing a history of the city of Baltimore 
emphasizing how racialized policies shaped the built environment. It analyzes the 
urban policies of the late 20th century that were designed to revitalize Sandtown-
Winchester. This thesis reviews of rightsizing as urban policy, and ends with 
recommendations for how the city can manage vacant properties in a more equitable 
and fair way. The recommendations suggest rightsizing policies be reformed in order 
to reconsider the effect that they have on disinvested minority populations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On April 12, 2015, the Baltimore Police Department arrested Freddie Gray, a 
young African-American man, at 1700 Presbury Street in the Sandtown-Winchester 
neighborhood of West Baltimore. His subsequent death as a result of injuries he 
sustained during his unrestrained transport in a police van across town sparked 
protests throughout the area nine days later. On April 25, protesters marched through 
Sandtown-Winchester on the very streets where Gray grew up. The marches were 
powerful rebukes of police brutality in Baltimore, but they also had the unintended 
consequence of shedding light on the urban condition of African-American residents 
living in one of the poorest neighborhoods of the city. As the cameras panned down 
the streets, an image entirely synonymous with Baltimore itself formed the backdrop: 
block after block of rowhouses. These were often not the rowhouses of John Water’s 
cinematic Baltimore, though, as on television it appeared that every other house was 
vacant, with boarded up windows and doors, weeds growing up around the stoops, and 
decaying cornice brackets.  
To those unfamiliar with the city, and even to some Baltimoreans, these 
images of apparent urban decay that splashed across the nightly news for weeks, came 
as a surprise. While the city’s vacant property inventory has been growing steadily 
since the 1970s, this fact was not a high-profile news story the way that it has been in 
cities such as Cleveland or Detroit. Suddenly the city’s vacant building problem, a 
paramount symbol of urban decline, was on display for the nation to see.  
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The protests also revealed another related reality of Baltimore, that inner-city 
neighborhoods did not display the same vitality as the revitalized inner harbor. As 
described by one protester, “The unrest was about more than Freddie Gray's death. 
This was also about residents tired of feeling abandoned and neglected within the city. 
They saw all the investment in the Inner Harbor but felt like their community was 
forgotten.”1 This sentiment was echoed by resident Tanisha Lewis who said “I have to 
go outside my community to go to the supermarket...there are some really good people 
here…[but] there’s no investment.”2  
Ashamed that their local problems had suddenly appeared on the national 
stage, city government officials devised a plan to address them. In addition to a broken 
police system and the distrust and disdain of many residents who felt disenfranchised, 
the city was forced to reevaluate its approach towards managing vacant properties. 
And while the city’s problems impacted many neighborhoods, they were all playing 
out in the microcosm of Sandtown-Winchester, a community that had experienced the 
ebbs and flows of revitalization over the years, but was once again in decline.  
Baltimore has had programs in place to address vacant buildings since the 
1970s. Each program has been a response tailored to a particular political and 
economic climate in the city’s history, and has achieved varying degrees of success. 
Following the events of April 2015, Baltimore embarked on its largest investment yet 
in attempting to solve the problem of blighted properties across the city. On January 5, 
                                                 
1 Ron Snyder, “One year later: looking back at the Baltimore riots,” WBAL-TV, April 28, 2016, 
http://www.wbaltv.com/article/one-year-later-looking-back-at-the-baltimore-riots/7100345.  
 
2 Noah Bierman and Joseph Tanfani, “In Baltimore, riots appear where urban renewal didn’t,” Los 
Angeles Times, April 28, 2015.  
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2016, Governor Larry Hogan and then Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake announced 
Project Creating Opportunities for Renewal and Enterprise, better known as Project 
C.O.R.E., only a few blocks away from where Gray was arrested. The goal of Project 
C.O.R.E. is to demolish 4,000 vacant buildings across the city over the course of four 
years. The initiative is divided into two phases; Phase I, the demolition phase, is 
funded through a $75 million investment from the state, and $18.5 million from 
Baltimore City. Phase II, the redevelopment phase, officials claim will be funded by 
extracting $600 million from the Maryland Department of Housing and Community 
Development programs towards new investment in communities affected by Phase I 
demolitions.3 
For over ten years, many cities that have lost 20 percent or more of their 
population during the latter half of the 20th century, have adopted public policy 
initiatives that involve widespread demolition of the built environment. Since 2014 
Detroit has demolished over 10,000 properties at an average cost of $12,619 each. In 
2016 alone there were 3,136 demolitions.4 Massive demolition programs in these cities 
inspired architect and professor Keller Easterling to remark that “the major building 
project for most U.S. mayors today is the removal of building.”5  
                                                 
3 “Four Year Plan,” Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, 
http://dhcd.maryland.gov/ProjectCORE/Pages/Plan.aspx. 
 
4 “Detroit Demolition Program,” City of Detroit, accessed January 31, 2017, 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/demolition. 
 
5 Keller Easterling, “Letters to the Mayor,” exhibition at the Storefront for Art and Architecture, April 
30, 2014-May 24, 2014, http://kellereasterling.com/exhibitions/letters-to-the-mayor.  
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 The roots of widespread demolition as planning theory and practice is 
rightsizing. Rightsizing is defined as restructuring the built environment in order to 
match the current and projected size of the population to the size of the built 
environment. As described by Brent D. Ryan, professor of Urban Design and Public 
Policy at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology, “rightsizing refers to the yet 
unproved process of bringing cities down to a “right” size, meaning a size 
proportionate to city government’s ability to pay for itself.”6 At first glance, 
rightsizing appears to be an appropriate policy response for the problems it seeks to 
address. Older industrial cities have high levels of vacancy and abandonment, vacant 
properties are closely linked with crime and draining tax revenues, these cities do not 
have a housing market that can support saving thousands of vacant properties, thus 
demolishing these properties is the most obvious solution.7  
Concerned with the effect that widespread demolition policies might have on 
historic buildings, preservationists have recently been advocating for more 
consideration of these resources in rightsizing planning. While it would appear that 
demolition policies and historic preservation are inherently at odds, to some 
preservationists the two can exist in tandem. Through both their respective master’s 
theses and careers, Cara Bertron and Emilie Evans have attempted to define the role 
                                                 
6 Brent D. Ryan, “Rightsizing Shrinking Cities: The urban design dimension,” in The City After 
Abandonment, ed. Margaret Dewar and June Manning Thomas, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 268.  
 
7 Witold Rybczynski and Peter D Linneman, “How to save our shrinking cities,” Public Interest 135, 
(1999): 30-44.   
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that historic preservation should play in rightsizing initiatives.8 Bertron is the Director 
of the Preservation Rightsizing Network, a coalition of planners, preservationists, 
community development organizations, and other stakeholders working together to 
develop tools and strategies for influencing planning policies. Evans is the Secretary 
of this group, and is the Director of the Rightsizing Cities Initiative with the 
preservation consulting firm PlaceEconomics. Evans previously worked as Detroit 
Preservation Specialist, and lead the windshield surveys that helped decision makers 
make choices about what would be demolished in the city. Bertron, who during a 2014 
lecture at the University of the Arts said “our job as preservationists is to argue for 
rightsizing,” thinks that arguing for “strategic demolition” is one way to help the 
preservation profession gain greater respect in planning circles.9  
What proponents of rightsizing have yet to address is how the racial 
composition of a neighborhood factors in rightsizing planning. Failing to address race 
as a metric is problematic because the majority of abandonment in shrinking cities is 
in disinvested, predominantly minority population neighborhoods. Thus, in the context 
of majority African-American neighborhoods like Sandtown-Winchester, widespread 
demolition policies become more than just misguided policy decisions. It becomes an 
issue of social justice by raising questions about who ‘shrinking cities’ are being 
restructured for, and who benefits from this restructuring.  
                                                 
8 See Cara Berton “Between a rock and a historic place: preservation in Postindustrial Urban Planning,” 
(master’s thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2011) and Emilie Evans “Historic Preservation in 
Shrinking Cities: Neighborhood Strategies for Buffalo and Cleveland,” (master’s thesis, Columbia 
University, 2011).  
 
9 Ashley Hahn, “Pro-demolition preservationists? Cara Bertron explores rightsizing and demolition.” 
PlanPhilly, February 14, 2014, http://planphilly.com/eyesonthestreet/2014/02/14/pro-demolition-
preservationists-cara-bertron-explores-rightsizing-and-preservation. 
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Statement of Purpose  
 This thesis critiques the rightsizing of American cities through an examination 
of Project C.O.R.E. and the projected impact it will have on the Sandtown-Winchester 
neighborhood of Baltimore, Maryland. It suggests that as a result of this initiative, the 
city will lose valuable cultural and architectural resources, particularly in Sandtown-
Winchester. Current planning theory suggests that rightsizing policies are the most 
appropriate and effective response to vacancy and abandonment in shrinking cities. 
Furthermore, current theorizing poses that rightsizing will improve cities by targeting 
investment in so-called “middle neighborhoods” that are the most stable or have the 
greatest potential for revitalization. Proponents of rightsizing claim that this strategy 
will save shrinking cities by targeting reinvestment in the most viable areas while 
strategically demolishing other areas to make these cities smaller and more 
economically sound. This thesis rejects these notions for three reasons. The first is that 
rightsizing policies generally do not take historic resources into proper consideration. 
The second is that because neighborhoods with high levels of vacant properties are 
more likely to be minority neighborhoods, widespread demolition policies destroy the 
tangible and intangible cultural heritage of minority communities. This is problematic 
not only because of the racist nature of the policy reminiscent of urban renewal 
policies of the mid-20th century, but because it creates a radically racialized city in 
which majority white neighborhoods with more stable housing markets are not 
demolished and predominantly minority neighborhoods with higher vacancy rates are 
erased. The third problem with these policies is that they are a shortsighted, misguided 
way to deal with complex, wide-ranging urban problems. Rightsizing addresses the 
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symptom of neighborhood appearance, while ignoring deeper, more complex 
problems related to urban blight and abandonment.  
 This thesis ultimately argues that rightsizing is an unjust policy that 
perpetuates the racist legacy of city planning as a discipline. It suggests that Project 
C.O.R.E. will disadvantage historically African-American communities in Baltimore, 
Maryland, and that this is a negative outcome from an equity standpoint. Rightsizing is 
morally problematic because it values the built and cultural landscapes of certain 
racial and ethnic groups over others. This thesis posits that Baltimore should pursue 
more inclusive and democratic planning strategies that benefit and include the city’s 
diverse population.  
 
Note on Terminology  
 There are several terms repeated in this thesis that require clarification for the 
sake of the argument. In this work, legacy city or legacy cities refers to cities in the 
United States of America with populations over 100,000 people that have lost at least 
25 percent of their populations over the past 40 years. Synonyms for this term 
employed in this thesis include “shrinking cities,” and “Rust Belt cities.” The phrase 
“vacant buildings” refers to properties that are not currently inhabited. In the context 
of this thesis the term “vacant” or “vacancy” refers to properties that are not currently 
formally inhabited. This term will be used interchangeably with “abandoned building” 
or “abandoned property,” which is defined as a property where the owner has ceased 
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to maintain the building, physically, financially, or otherwise.10 The term rightsizing 
here refers to the physical restructuring of the footprint of cities to better match the 
size of the population. This word is spelled differently in various literature, thus quotes 
may read “right-sizing” or “right sizing,” but should be considered synonymous. The 
neighborhood of concern in this work is called Sandtown-Winchester. It is apart of a 
larger area of the city that will be referred to as West Baltimore that encompasses 21 
total neighborhoods. Prior to formal neighborhood distinctions, the entire area was 
historically known as Old West Baltimore. The names “Old West Baltimore” and 
“West Baltimore” will be used synonymously in this work.  
 
Methodology  
 Much of the primary source research involved reading the extensive reporting 
published over the decades in the Baltimore Sun accessed through the Cornell 
University Library System. Additional sources included planning journals such as the 
Journal of the American Planning Association, also found in the Cornell University 
Library System. City plans were accessed through city government websites. A visit to 
Baltimore allowed for both empirical research through visiting Sandtown-Winchester, 
as well as for the gleaning information from interview subjects. A trip to the Baltimore 
City Archives allowed the author to access documents from the Department of 
Planning.  
                                                 
10 Alan Mallach, Bringing Buildings Back: from abandoned properties to community assets: a 
Guidebook for Policymakers and Practitioners, (Montclair, N.J.: New Brunswick, N.J.: National 
Housing Institute; Distributed by Rutgers University Press, 2006), 1.  
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 Additional secondary source research in the Cornell Library System included 
books such as Baltimore: The Building of an American City which was the author’s 
main source for the history of the city. A number of other texts helped frame the 
author’s thoughts on the role of historic preservation in rightsizing cities including 
Max Page’s Why Preservation Matters.  
 
Limitations 
 
This thesis is limited by a number of factors. The first is that the author has 
never lived in Sandtown-Winchester or the City of Baltimore. Lacking this intimacy 
with the subject, the author’s understanding of the problems and promises of the place 
is necessarily constrained. Another limitation is that the author does not identify with 
the racial identity she claims will be negatively affected by these policies. Considering 
that discourses on the effects of rightsizing are relatively new, there is limited research 
available on this subject. An additional limitation is that the author has never lived in 
an area that has been affected by rightszing policies. And finally, this is a complex 
subject that has been fomenting for decades, and this thesis cannot hope to fully 
address or even describe the multiple narratives, situations, decisions, or forces at 
work in Baltimore.  
 
Chapter Overview  
 The first chapter provides a history of the City of Baltimore with an emphasis 
on race relations, urban planning, and economic forces that have shaped the city. This 
chapter provides context to the analysis of the city’s current planning. Chapter Two is 
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a discussion and evaluation of past revitalization efforts in the Sandtown-Winchester 
neighborhood as well as a description of the neighborhood today. This chapter is 
meant to provide context for the suggestions for future revitalization efforts. The third 
chapter provides a history of rightsizing as a planning policy, and examines the effects 
it has had on cities thus far. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for 
analyzing rightsizing policy in Baltimore. Chapter Four is an examination of the 
history of Baltimore’s vacant-building initiatives and an analysis of how other 
strategies besides demolition can have a positive effect on Sandtown-Winchester. The 
conclusion argues that Project C.O.R.E. and rightsizing policies more broadly are 
damaging for cities, and suggests that further research is needed to understand the 
links between issues of race, rightsizing, and preservation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE HISTORY OF BALTIMORE CITY  
 
 
Baltimore was an important early colonial city that became and remained an 
industrial and manufacturing hub throughout the mid-19th century. By the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century, however, Baltimore struggled to keep pace 
and was surpassed in population by cities like Chicago, St. Louis, and Cleveland.  The 
rowhouse became established as the vernacular architectural form as early as the 
1790s, and remains the predominant residential building type found in the city. As a 
city near the Mason-Dixon line, Baltimore has had to reconcile with the interests of 
residents on both sides of the coin on matters related to race relations, not only during 
the Civil War era, but throughout its history. While Baltimore had a more diverse 
economy than many other industrial cities, deindustrialization and suburbanization 
following World-War II negatively impacted the size of the population of the city, as 
well as the number of occupied housing units. Ashamed of the image of the inner-city, 
in 1974 Baltimore rebranded itself with the nickname “Charm City,” to attract new 
residents and tourists and improve its reputation.1 Today Baltimore struggles to 
balance the interests of its tourist and service-sector economy with the needs of a 
multitude of lower-income neighborhoods with significant numbers of vacant 
properties.  
                                                 
1 James D. Dilts, “In $40,000 tourist drive: Ad dubs Baltimore ‘Charm City,’ Baltimore Sun, July 11, 
1974.  
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The history of the city is told in this chapter in six sections: Colonial history, 
the city’s founding through the 1820s; industrialization and immigration to the 1850s; 
the origins of the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood to the end of the century; the 
fire of 1904 through the Great Depression; the Post-World War II urban crisis; and 
contemporary Baltimore. This overview focuses primarily on three major themes of 
the city’s history: city planning, the economy, and the African-American history of 
Baltimore. 
 
Colonial Baltimore  
 
The City of Baltimore is located on the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay in 
the state of Maryland. Prior to colonization, the area had been inhabited by the 
Susquehannock Indian tribes for hundreds of years. The area was first explored by the 
English in 1609, led by Captain John Smith. In 1634 the settlers formed an official 
colony led by Leonard Calvert.  By 1650 the proprietor of the colony, Lord Baltimore, 
had begun issuing land grants of approximately one thousand acres in the area.2 These 
early land owners were granted the right to collect taxes and fees and had control over 
the future sale of the land. Early colonists grew tobacco, which quickly became the 
common currency of the settlement. Subsistence farming, the tobacco trade, and the 
slave economy sustained the colony.  
Baltimore, named after Lord Baltimore, was founded in 1730. The primary 
reason settlers started a colony in the Baltimore area is because of the advantages that 
                                                 
2 Sherry H. Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), 2.  
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the landscape offered. The most critical resource to the establishment of colonies in 
the New World was water. Baltimore had land suitable for farming and also had 
abundant water resources. Aside from the Bay, Baltimore had a series of streams and 
waterfalls due to its topographic configuration. The region can be understood 
topographically as distinguished by the piedmont, or the high lands, and the tidewater, 
or the lowlands surrounding the bay. In the early 1700s settlers began to build mills on 
the waterfalls. These included Jones Falls, Gwynns Falls, Gwynns Run, Great 
Gunpowder, and Little Gunpowder.3 The mills helped diversify the area’s largely 
tobacco-based economy by allowing them to make new products such as flour. This 
became crucial to the economy of the new colony when the price of tobacco declined 
for a significant period of time beginning in 1732.4 
The early settlers in Baltimore were mostly English and French. One quarter of 
the slaves in what would become the state of Maryland were brought between 1710 
and 1720. In 1715 the Maryland assembly formally declared that the sons and 
daughters of slaves are born slaves.5 Blacks made up one-sixth of the population in 
1715, and the majority of slaves worked on tobacco plantations.  
‘Baltimore Town,’ was officially founded and planned in 1730 (Figure 1.1). 
The early city was laid out in a manner similar to that of an early English village. The 
new ‘town’ had two perpendicular streets, each 66-feet-wide. Long Street, now 
                                                 
3 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 5.  
 
4 Ibid., 5. 
 
5 Ibid., 4.  
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Baltimore Street, was a longitudinal street intended to be a place for businesses. 
Calvert Street, a latitudinal street, ran from the waterfront at the harbor to the bluff 
overlooking Jones Falls. This plan platted sixty one-acre square lots.6 The early street 
plans were created not only to exploit the waterfront, where trade through the harbor 
was essential to the survival of the town, but also to provide a natural drainage route 
from the piedmont to the bay. Two years after Baltimore was laid out, Jones Town 
was laid out directly east of Jones Falls into half-acre lots on ten acres.7 
 
                                                 
6 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 7.  
 
7 Ibid., 8.  
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Figure 1.1. Close-up of Poppleton’s 1822 plat of the City of Baltimore, with Phillip 
Jones’ 1730 survey of the city outlined. Courtesy of the Library of Congress 
Geography & Map Division.  
 
After the French and Indian War and prior to the Revolution it became 
important to the town to connect Fells Point and Baltimore Town. The land between 
these two places became known as Harrison’s marsh, and Baltimore Town was 
authorized to annex, wharf out, and fill this area. In 1779 the marsh was surveyed and 
platted, adding one hundred and thirty-five acres to the city.8  
                                                 
8 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 13.  
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When the city incorporated in 1796, the population neared 25,000 people, 
making Baltimore the third largest city in the United States after New York and 
Philadelphia.9 The growth of the city’s population was in part fueled by an increase in 
French immigration. Between 1785 and 1815 the French population increased by 
tenfold and the French made up one third of the city. French immigrants were 
typically highly skilled and held positions as doctors, merchants, and shopkeepers. 
They brought with them Catholicism, and helped establish St. Mary’s Seminary, 
which would become crucial in the development of Catholic education, as well as 
making Baltimore an administrative center of the faith in the United States.10 
The 1790s were also when the rowhouse became a popular building form in 
the city. After touring Europe, architect Charles Bulfinch came back to America in 
1793 and proposed building a series of sixteen three-story houses all three bays wide 
in Boston. Bulfinch learned these building concepts in England, and used Palladian 
ideas as inspiration for the design of the primary facades for these houses.11 These 
designs were later copied by Thomas McElderry and Cumberland Dugan, who began 
constructing rowhouses in Baltimore in 1796.12 After constructing wharves extending 
from Market Street, they built long rows of houses on either side that were three-and 
one-half stories tall with hipped roofs and dormer windows. They also had high 
                                                 
9 Mary Ellen Hayward and Charles Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 1999), 20.  
 
10 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 29.  
 
11 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 16.  
 
12 Ibid., 17.  
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English basements that provided for commercial space at the wharf level, and had 
prominent stone stringcourses. Others builders followed suit, including John 
O’Donnell, who built two rows of six houses facing one another on Commerce Street, 
and Richard Canton, who constructed four three-and-one-half story three-bay-wide 
rowhouses at present day Lombard and Front Streets.13  
Important to the construction of both residential and commercial properties in 
Baltimore at the time was the ground rent system. Originating from an English custom 
of exacting a tithe from yeoman farmers who farmed on a noble’s land, through the 
ground rent system land is rented for lengthy periods of time to others who then build 
upon the land. The builder can occupy the site or collect rents from building tenants, 
while he or she pays the ground rent to the landowner.14 This system was introduced 
to Baltimore by Thomas Harrison who began renting lots in 1750. Builders leased the 
land for an annual fee with renewals and no down payment. To enhance investments, 
some ground renters offered advanced mortgages to builders. This incentive gave 
builders a loan to pay for construction costs, and increased the return for landowners.15 
While common in early British-American colonies of Pennsylvania and Maryland, 
eventually the ground rent system fell out of use and favor in many places except 
Baltimore.16  
                                                 
13 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 18.  
 
14 Ibid., 12.  
 
15 Ibid., 14.  
 
16 Ibid., 13.  
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Figure 1.2. 1801 Map of Baltimore showing the parts of city ‘Old Town,’ and ‘Fell’s 
Point.’ Courtesy of Cornell Library Map & Geospatial Information Collection.  
 
With the ground rent system in place and the population growing, the city 
required a new plat. In 1816 Thomas H. Poppleton became chief surveyor for the city 
and he was charged with surveying and laying out the grid for the extension of the city 
after its acreage had tripled through annexation. In this plat Poppleton created new 
roads and extended existing ones, but did not include any public squares. Instead the 
grid pattern was all residential blocks, extended based on the older part of town’s one-
acre squares.17 Poppleton also created a street hierarchy that included front streets, 
side streets, and alley “streets” of differing widths.18 Poppleton’s plat, as it became 
                                                 
17 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 29.  
 
18 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 57.  
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known, created a pattern that dictated future construction in the city, including the 
possibility for alley dwellings to be built.  
 
 
Figure 1.3. Poppleton’s Plat, 1822. Courtesy of the Library of Congress Geography & 
Map Division. 
 
 
Boom Town on the Bay  
One of the prominent enterprises in early Baltimore was the railroad industry. 
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company consolidated in 1827, making it one of the 
oldest railroad companies in the United States. This allowed Baltimore to compete 
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economically with cities that were prospering from increasing trade with more western 
states through canals.19 The construction of the railroad soon became the metric for 
land speculation in the city since landowners hoped that having the railroad come 
through their part of town would increase their own property values.20 The 
incorporation of the railroad also spurred the growth of supporting industries such as 
machine works, foundries, and bridge construction. Warehouses and factories were 
built along the waterfront, and the profits of these companies allowed the new elites to 
construct fashionable residential properties.21 
 As industry prospered, the city needed to house not only the wealthy 
industrialists, but also the burgeoning working class. The new rowhouses built in the 
mid-1800s to house members of this class continued to be built in the Greek Revival 
style. Builder Michael Roche, who had already been constructing homes for wealthier 
Baltimoreans, built a large number of two-and-one-half story rowhomes for workers. 
Called “two story and attic” dwellings, these modest houses were two stories tall and 
two bays (approximately 14-feet) wide, with attic windows that provided the 
appearance of a third story. This half-story attic could be divided into two separate 
rooms, which provided more living space for large families, or for those who took in 
boarders for extra money. Constructed in working class neighborhoods between 1845 
and 1855, they provided housing for people who could not afford to take public 
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transportation to their jobs. These houses were built in the Fells Point and Federal Hill 
neighborhoods, early maritime communities close to the harbor,  as well as in the 
rapidly growing areas west of downtown.22 
       
 
Illustration 1.1. 918-920 Lemmon Street example of two-story plus attic Greek             
Revival rowhouses built in the 1840s for working class residents, currently the Irish 
Railroad Workers Museum. Photograph by Dr. John R. Breihan. 
 
 
 The growth of the railroad industry along with the construction of the Ohio 
state canals brought new immigrants to Baltimore during the 1830s. In 1830 and again 
two years later the immigrant population doubled. The majority of immigrants came 
from England, Germany, and Ireland.23 The Irish population in the city settled just 
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west of downtown on West Pratt Street northeast of and within walking distance of the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad’s Mt. Clare Yards. This community continued to grow 
through the 1840s as more Irish arrived and became employed by the rapidly growing 
railroad industry.24 
 Before the Civil War, Baltimore’s African-American population included both 
free blacks and slaves. While Baltimoreans generally believed that slaves in the city 
were treated better than slaves on plantations throughout the state, city slave owners 
still had brutal ownership privileges, such as the right to take their slaves to the local 
jail to be whipped.25 Meanwhile, free blacks in the city sought education through 
various means including in church, but were denied entry into public schools despite 
the fact that they paid taxes that supported those schools. In 1825, white citizens 
formed the Anti-Slavery society, which had its strongest membership among 
communities that did not have substantial slave populations.26 In the debates about 
slavery in Baltimore, tensions arose from differences in opinion between city-dwellers 
and those living in the rest of the state. The state legislature’s Brawner Commission 
recommended resettlement to Liberia as the only way to solve racial tensions. Many 
white abolitionist leaders in the city regarded this extreme position as an example of 
state oppression of Baltimore by the rural, slaveholding communities and interests. 
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Baltimoreans sought compromise on the issue of slavery but did not, as a city, take a 
strong stance either defending or decrying slavery.27 
 Despite this ambivalence, the leader and one of the most important figures of 
the abolitionist movement would pass through the city in the early 19th century. 
Frederick Douglass was brought to Baltimore as a young man in 1825 to run errands 
and look after the son of Hugh and Sophia Auld. Sophia began to teach Douglass to 
read, but Hugh forbid it. Douglass lived with the Auld’s in Fells Point, on the 1400 
block of Philpot Street, where he would often bribe the white boys in the 
neighborhood to teach him to read.28 Although in reference to his time in Baltimore, 
Douglass described how “a city slave is almost a freeman” when compared to 
plantation slaves, he still faced significant discrimination.29 In the 1830s, prior to his 
escape, Douglass worked as a shipyards caulker, an almost all African-American 
profession. In this position he was constantly beaten and harassed by white workers, 
who were resentful about having to work with black men, and anxious that blacks 
would threaten whites’ jobs.30  
 As the railroad and manufacturing industries grew, advancements in 
transportation technology changed the way that people traversed the city. The first 
horse-drawn omnibus line was organized in 1845 and made two daily trips to Towson, 
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a rural farming community to the north of the city. The omnibus line also went 
between Fells Point and Canton, an approximately one-mile trip along the harbor.31 
These lines were laid along pre-existing routes that connected middle- and upper-class 
neighborhoods with business districts. The fare was expensive, so it could only be 
afforded by wealthier residents. Originally crossing noisy cobblestone streets, by the 
1850s the horse-drawn carriages had iron wheels and travelled on iron tracks.32 
 The horse-drawn omnibuses would soon serve a greater purpose than 
transporting the wealthy across town; they would help create a city park system. 
Concerned over the increased pressure on the water supply, the city decided to 
develop Druid Lake into a reservoir and also a city park in the 1850s.33 In order to 
finance the burgeoning park project the city levied twenty percent of the profits from 
fares on the omnibus lines. In 1860 the city was able to expand Patterson Park and to 
develop Druid Hill Park through purchasing the Rogers estate. After five years of 
levying the tax, the city had raised over $9 million. City parks were seen as necessary 
not only for recreational purposes in an increasingly congested city, but also because 
they were perceived to be a public health solution to disease. The development of a 
park system in the city was also related to Baltimore trying to keep up with New York 
and Philadelphia, who already had numerous parks of their own.34 
 
                                                 
31 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 112.  
 
32 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 53. 
 
33 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 137.  
 
34 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 59.  
 
  25 
The Beginning of Sandtown, the Ending of a Unified Baltimore  
 A pivotal moment in the history of the city was its divorce from the county in 
1851. Leading up to this decision there were disputes over whether the city or the 
county should settle questions about representation, taxation, and criminal justice. 
When the city revised tax assessments in 1841, many within the city government 
accused the wealthy of tax evasion by claiming their summer country homes in the 
county as their main residences. In order to address these problems, the state of 
Maryland called for a constitutional convention in 1851. Along with other reforms, the 
new constitution separated the city and county of Baltimore from each other.35 
 The same year, Mayor John H.T. Jerome appointed the Boundary Avenue 
Commission to design a plan to expand open spaces by creating a 250-foot-wide 
parkway around the city. The commission wrote the report and the city surveyor 
created plats and profiles in order to determine the feasibility of the plan. The schemes 
would have cost a significant amount of money at the time, and would have required 
re-grading and rebuilding along the northern boundary. It would have also required 
cooperation between city and county. The main obstacle, however, was that 
Poppleton’s orthogonal city design of 1816 could not accommodate all the alterations 
to the grid that would have been necessary for the Boundary Avenue scheme to be 
executed.36  
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 The story of the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood dates back to 1857, when 
the city purchased the land to develop Lafayette Square Park on the west side of the 
city. The Civil War brought construction on the park and surrounding residential 
developments to a halt, and the area was an army camp and barracks for the duration 
of hostilities. Following the war, building resumed and three-story pressed-brick 
Italianate rowhouses were constructed throughout the area. Approximately three 
blocks southwest of Lafayette Square, Harlem Park was developed in the 1870s and 
1880s.37 The neighborhoods of Sandtown-Winchester and Harlem Park developed 
around these two parks, as well as Franklin and Union Squares, and became the new 
residential area for the middle- and upper-middle-class white elite. The neighborhoods 
were both close to the countryside and sited on higher ground, providing a view of the 
harbor.38 The dominant mythology of how Sandtown received its name is that wagons 
travelling through the area from local quarries would spill sand on the ground.39 
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Illustration 1.2. Example of three-story pressed brick Italianate rowhouses at the 
intersection of Baker and Gilmor Streets, Sandtown-Winchester. Photograph by 
author, November 17, 2016. 
 
 Harlem Park, just south of Sandtown-Winchester, was once a fifty-six-acre 
estate owned by Dr. Thomas Edmondson. When he died in 1856, the trustees of his 
estate donated ten acres of the land to be a public park. They then sold a block of land 
east of the park to Maryland Consolidated Land Company. Construction commenced 
in 1868 under the stipulation that the houses be three-stories-tall and sixteen-feet-
wide. Maryland Consolidated both developed houses in the area themselves, as well as 
sold parcels to other developers.40 The most prolific developer in Harlem Park was 
Joseph Cone, who by 1878 had built 145 houses near Harlem Park utilizing the 
popular architectural Italianate style of the period. On Fulton Avenue, Cone varied the 
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style by adding oriels to the second and third story windows of the houses in order to 
break up the monotony of the repetitive buildings.41  
 Aiding the rapid urbanization that occurred in the city at the turn of the 20th 
century were new electric streetcars. The first electric overhead trolley was used in 
Virginia in 1888, and by 1890 Baltimore had its first streetcar line.42 By mid-1893 
there were eighty miles of overhead electric lines for streetcars across the city.43 The 
old horse car companies quickly converted into electric systems, and consolidated in 
1899 to form the United Railways & Electric Company. These new lines were able to 
carry more passengers than horse cars and could also move people twice as fast.44 
 As a result of the electric streetcar, for the first time it was possible for people 
outside the upper-class to live some distance from where they worked. The majority of 
suburbs that developed during the late 19th century in Baltimore were commuter 
suburbs. Developing from electric streetcar lines, suburbs like Roland Park, West 
Arlington, and Catonsville were designed for the upper-middle class. The 
development costs of creating these new communities were high since the cost of new 
water lines, streets, house building, and lighting were assumed by the development 
company. Roland Park became the model for future suburban developments in 
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Baltimore. The streets of the new suburb curved in accordance with the contours of the 
land, a change from the grid-like development of the city.45 
 In 1888, the city held a referendum for the annexation of twenty-three square 
miles, almost tripling the area of the city, mostly to the north and west. The successful 
outcome of the vote led to a boom in the real estate industry as speculators bought up 
the new land to capture the increase of land values. At least 40,000 houses were built 
following the annexation, doubling the number of houses in the city. While other cities 
suffered a drop in construction in the 1890s, Baltimore fared better, and also had a 
higher percentage of homeowners. This housing boom not only employed a great 
number of people, but also benefitted the working and middle classes, who were able 
to purchase new houses.46 
 Along with annexation and the streetcar, another important factor in the 
building boom was the modernization of the construction industry, brought about by 
the introduction of new techniques and the standardization of existing ones. Baltimore 
brickmakers and bricklayers became well-known for the excellence of their work, and 
woodwork for doors and sashes came preformed from mills instead of being hand 
carved in a carpenter’s shop. Most of the houses built during this time had cold water, 
one-fifth had bathtubs.47 
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While at this time housing segregation had not yet been solidified, and 
African-Americans could live across the city, many black residents lived in 
“Pigtown,” a neighborhood southwest Camden Station. They lived amongst Russian 
Jews and Italians, two of the other lower-class ethnic groups in the city at the time. 
The immigration of Italians to Baltimore in the 1890s led to many African-American’s 
being pushed out of jobs, including those on the railroad.  Less than one percent of the 
city was comprised of black professionals.48 
 
Reforms for a ‘Greater Baltimore’  
In 1904 Baltimore suffered a large fire that destroyed much of what was laid 
out in 1730. Spurred by high winds and hampered by freezing temperatures, 1,545 
buildings were destroyed over a 140-acre district.49 The city had outlawed frame 
construction in 1799, but even the “fireproof” brick structures downtown could not 
withstand the flames.50 Following the fire, the city made plats of each block and 
surveyed and marked the old building lines. Much of downtown was rebuilt by 
replicating what was there before the fire, and minor plat changes like the widening of 
streets were rare.51 The fire also spurred another rowhouse building boom, in part to 
house the population which had doubled over the past twenty years.52   
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Illustration 1.3. View of Baltimore Street between Calvert and Guilford Streets, with 
City Hall in the foreground, following the 1904 fire. Photograph courtesy of the 
Maryland Historical Society. 
 
 In spite of its rapid expansion in building, industry, and population, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century Baltimore was the only city of its size that did not 
have a modern sewer system.53 A plan to remedy this, the “Greater Baltimore” 
strategy, was announced in 1903 but stalled because of the fire.54 The plan was to 
create a dual system, one for storm water runoff and another for sanitation.55 The 
completion of these systems transformed the city not just below ground, but also 
above ground as houses became connected and privies were abandoned. Modern 
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sewage also changed the alleyways of city which were previously full of water 
drainage from laundry and other uses, which became layers of ice during the winter.56 
Another result of the sewage system were advancements in road planning. Jones Falls, 
for example, frequently presented a problem in planning in the city because of its 
tendency to flood, but through the sewer system it was canalized in a concrete channel 
and a road was put over it.57 
 The design of the sewage system forced Baltimore to pay for the mapping 
necessary to finally understand how to make sewage flow downhill. In turn, the new 
topographical survey served as the catalyst for addressing additional city planning 
issues and resulted in the creation of an annex street plan, the activities of a street 
paving commission, a factory site commission, and a city planning commission.58 In 
this new era of planning the two topographical regions of the city became the focus: 
the piedmont and the tidewater. In the piedmont, a new street plan was developed for 
recently annexed lands that followed a conventional grid pattern and brought together 
previously developed streets. By 1902, the city required developers to submit plats for 
new subdivisions whereas previously these developments were carried out 
independently of other planned schemes in the city. Street grading became a major 
concern and priority of planning in 1908.59 The more seriously Baltimore took the 
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topographical realities exposed through the survey, the better it was able to plan for 
the future of the city. 
 During the early 20th century, the black population of Baltimore increased as a 
result of the Great Migration. During the first wave of this migration, black residents 
came from both the rural south and rural areas of the state of Maryland. Forced to 
move away from these areas as a result of decreased farming yields, and drawn to the 
city by the promise of work in the industrial economy, between 1880 and 1920 the 
black population in Baltimore grew from 54,000 to 108,000.60  
The beginning of the movement of African-Americans from south Baltimore to 
West Baltimore started in 1885. Before the late 19th century, there was not a 
predominantly African-American neighborhood in the city, and black residents lived 
amongst whites throughout the city.61 As more residents moved in, however, blacks 
began moving out of overcrowded and unsanitary alley dwellings near Camden Yards 
to the area historically known as Old West Baltimore, located between North Avenue 
and Franklin Street to the north and south, and Madison and Fulton Streets to the east 
and west starting in 1885. As they moved in, the existing German population moved 
out to more northwestern parts of the city and county.62 Druid Hill Avenue was home 
to upper-class African-Americans, while middle- and lower-class residents lived in 
smaller homes on the surrounding streets. The poorest residents in this area lived in 
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alley houses, small buildings located behind the street-facing rowhomes. While nearly 
all of these have since been demolished, one alley street, known as “Lung Block,” 
became infamous in the city because its rate of tuberculosis was astronomically higher 
than that found in the rest of the city.63  
Although black residents both old and new had carved out a section of the west 
side of the city for themselves, they still faced significant discrimination in the early 
20th century. When African-Americans came to Baltimore they found themselves in a 
challenging job market that enforced a racial hierarchy system. Black barbers 
struggled when the barbers examining board was created, and white laundresses 
received contracts with hospitals and restaurants while thousands of black laundresses 
worked at home and did not receive contracts. Although a new ten-hour labor law had 
recently been implemented, it did not apply to domestic work, a major industry for 
black women. Garment factories employed black women as pressers, the lowest-paid 
job, and at least one factory had a separate working floor and entrance for blacks.64 In 
the building trades, black men were largely excluded except for work as hod carriers. 
 Segregation was also the policy in city schools. In spite of the massive increase 
in population, no new schools were constructed for blacks during this time. Between 
1898 and 1915 all of the new African-American schools were older buildings passed 
down by white schools that had built new structures. Overcrowding was a major 
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problem in these schools, and most students only went to school for half of the day. In 
addition, new child labor laws did not apply to black children, so many continued to 
work and did not go to school full-time, if at all. Black teachers and principals had 
autonomy in governance of their schools, but were not paid commensurately with 
whites in the same profession, nor were they given a path to promotion in the city 
education system.65  
 The housing market further solidified the segregation already occurring in the 
city. Immigration from Europe occurred contemporaneously with the migration of 
African-Americans to Baltimore, which increased the strain on an already 
overburdened housing market. While whites continued to prevent blacks from moving 
into their neighborhoods, the housing supply for blacks did not increase, and 
overcrowding was common. The rate at which the city expanded could not keep up 
with the rate of African-American migration to the city. The only black suburb at the 
time was Patapsco Park.66 Demolition of existing housing further increased the strain 
on the housing supply for African-Americans. When the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Company expanded Camden Station, 200 houses occupied by black residents were 
razed. The creation of the St. Paul Street squares also meant the demolition of black 
housing. Decreasing supply led to increased rents, but instead of using the money to 
maintain and improve the buildings, landlords frequently pocketed the money. This 
cycle fed the slumlord dynasties that started during the era of legal housing 
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segregation in the city between 1913 and 1917 and continued to affect the black 
housing market throughout the mid to late-20th century. African-Americans in the city 
consistently paid more for rent than their white counterparts for the same 
accommodations.67  
 During World War I, Baltimore capitalized upon its location and resources to 
try and prove its worth as an indispensable industrial and manufacturing hub. By 1917, 
Baltimore was the nation’s seventh largest industrial area. At Sparrow’s Point, the 
Bethlehem Steel Company underwent a major expansion, building a tin-plate mill and 
a mill for rolling steel plates for tanks and battleships. Bethlehem Steel eventually 
became the second-largest producer of steel in the country, and was the supplier for 
projects such as New York City’s George Washington Bridge and San Francisco’s 
Municipal Railway.68 Shipbuilding became an important sector of the economy again 
and the Maryland Shipbuilding Company incorporated and hired two thousand 
workers. Wartime demand also increased the productivity of the labor force in the city.  
Manufacturing in the city increased by one third, and the value of manufactured 
products and exports tripled. After the war, Bethlehem Steel continued to be an 
important part of the local economy.69 The war increased Baltimore’s status as an 
important industrial city because it allowed the city to prove what it was capable of 
producing and contributing to the economy.  
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 In the post-World War I era, the city began to implement new, modern 
planning procedures and techniques that shaped the way Baltimore looks today. In 
1918 the city annexed sixty-two square miles of mostly undeveloped land, nearly 
tripling its size.70 The increase in land provided new opportunities for developers, but 
also forced the city to deal with planning issues in a more structured way than it had 
previously. Once again a topographical map was created in order to create street plans 
that included water, gas, and electric lines and conduits. The annexation also increased 
the pressure for comprehensive planning, and a separate City Plan Commission, Public 
Improvements Commission, and a Port Development Commission were created. The 
city passed a zoning ordinance and adopted a general street plan. The main goal of the 
zoning ordinance was to regulate densities. Baltimore mapped the city based on three 
metrics: building height zones, land use zones, and zones for number of dwellings 
permitted per residential acre. The city created a hierarchical system for land 
development under which only single, detached, residential dwellings could be built 
on the most valuable land, rowhouses and detached housing could be built on the 
second tier of land, and apartments as well as the aforementioned housing types could 
all be built on the third tier of land. In the new land use system, dwellings could be 
built in business zones, and businesses could be built in industrial zones, but the 
reverse of either of these was not permitted.71  
 During the interwar period, the racial discrimination across different sectors of 
the city worsened. Development of public facilities, for example, did not proceed at 
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the same rate for whites and blacks. A swimming pool was built for whites in Druid 
Hill Park, and a smaller pool was built for African-Americans. The number of black 
students attending school doubled during the 1920s. All thirteen black schools were 
housed in secondhand buildings, and many were recommended for demolition because 
they were not suitable for use. The types of vocational training offered in these schools 
were designed to feed the limited industries open to blacks post-graduation.72 Forced 
to work lower-class jobs in various service industries, as laborers in fertilizer plants, 
and in coal and lumber yards, economic and social advancement remained difficult for 
blacks to achieve.73  
 Racial discrimination in housing also became worse in the city. While the 
city’s segregation ordinance had been deemed unconstitutional, developers found 
other methods to impose segregation on the landscape. In the newly annexed land, the 
Roland Park Company that developed the land used racially restrictive covenants in 
deeds in order to prevent African-Americans from moving out of the central city. By 
the 1930s, the ‘old city,’ or the original 19th century areas of Baltimore were thirty 
percent black, while the land from the two annexations was around half of that, at 
seventeen percent.74 
While densities in African-American areas were similar to those of immigrant 
neighborhoods along the harbor in the late 19th century, density had since become 
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associated with overcrowding, regardless of whether overcrowding was actually 
occurring. Since these high-density areas were known to be majority black, and began 
to be seen as problematic, urban problems became synonymous with the “Negro 
problem.”75 In 1934, W.W. Emmart conducted a housing study for the Real Estate 
Board, in which he concluded that a half dozen neighborhoods formed a belt of blight 
in the core of the city and should be demolished or thinned in order to curb “crime, 
delinquency, and dependency.” 76 Many of these areas were the same ones targeted in 
Janet Kemp’s 1907 Housing Conditions in Baltimore which was concerned with 
several areas that had high densities and high rates of tuberculosis.77  
 In spite of the challenges black residents had gaining access to the same 
opportunities and neighborhoods in the early 20th century, Old West Baltimore was the 
center of a thriving black entertainment district. Pennsylvania Avenue featured 
theaters, bars, nightclubs, and shopping centers. Big name musicians such as Cab 
Calloway, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillepsie, and Count Bassie, all performed at the 
Douglass Theater, later renamed The Royal. Both Ella Fitzgerald and Billie Holliday 
were regulars there.78 Many of the businesses, including the Royal, were owned by 
                                                 
75 Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, 326.  
 
76 Ibid.  
 
77 Hayward and Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse, 170.  
 
78 Karen Olson, “Old West Baltimore: Segregation, African-American Culture, and the Struggle for 
Equality,” in The Baltimore Book: New Views of Local History, eds. Elizabeth Fee, Linda Shopes, and 
Linda Zeidman, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 65.  
 
  40 
Jewish merchants, but were havens for African-Americans who were discriminated 
against in so many other areas of the city.79  
 The African-American community in Baltimore at this time also had a 
powerful force behind it: the press. The Baltimore Afro-American was founded in 
1892 as a newspaper for the black community.80 The first editor of the paper was 
Reverand William Alexander, who was the pastor of the Sharon Baptist Church on 
North Stricker Street in Sandtown-Winchester.81 Over the years the newspaper 
covered stories pertinent to the black community that were often left out of The Sun, 
and advocated for a variety of causes, including an end to lynching, expanded job 
opportunities, decent housing, and inclusion on the city police force.82 During the 
Great Depression, when 40 percent of black Baltimoreans were unemployed, the Afro-
American urged readers to participate in the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign that was happening in cities across the country in order to put pressure on 
white-owned business to hire African-Americans.83 The paper supported the formation 
of a youth group to picket businesses on Pennsylvania Avenue in West Baltimore that 
refused to hire blacks in 1931.84 They also advocated for improved housing. In 1935 
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the paper accused the city of neglecting the African-American community by failing 
to acquire funding “for slum clearance and public housing” from the Public Works 
Administration.85 Throughout its existence, the Afro-American has held the city 
accountable for paying attention to the needs of the black community.  
During World War II, federal investments spurred industrial developments in 
Baltimore that mostly occurred on the periphery of the city. Industrial plants and 
federal housing were built in tidewater regions around Middle River and Curtis Bay, 
and military bases were built on coastal plain sites even further from the city.86 The 
city’s major products contributed to the assembly of ships and airplanes. However 
critical the products, Baltimore was passed over as an important industrial site because 
the country’s war effort became focused on winning the war in the Pacific—and San 
Francisco Bay and other West Coast sites were both better protected from attacks by 
German U-Boats and could install all new infrastructure and production facilities. 
While Baltimore was considered for the site of a tin smelter, it lost the commission to 
Longhorn, Texas. Midwest and Pacific Coast locations became favored for federally-
funded plants that created products such as light metals, aircraft engines, and synthetic 
rubber.87  
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Illustration 1.4. Sparrows Point Shipbuilding division of the Bethlehem Steel Company, 
steel mill featured in background, May 20, 1940. Photograph by Robert F. Kniesche for 
The Baltimore Sun.   
 
After World War II, the city faced a housing crisis as veterans returned from 
war, and the city’s population, particularly the black population continued to grow. 
African-Americans continued to be forced to reside in some of the oldest parts of the 
city because of housing discrimination. As reported by the Baltimore Sun in 1943, 
blacks had to live in the “Negro Archipelagoes” which at the time referred to the 
historically black communities including Sharp-Leadenhall in South Baltimore, East 
Baltimore beyond Old Town, and West Baltimore areas along Pennsylvania and Druid 
Hill Avenues. One-fifth of the population of the city was black in 1940, and yet the 
entire African-American population lived in only one-fiftieth of the land area.88 
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 There were two major responses to the overcrowding and poor housing 
conditions in black neighborhoods: blockbusting and blight removal. The origin of 
blockbusting in the city dates to 1910 when Margaret G. Franklin Brewer, a white 
woman, sold her house on McCullough Avenue to W. Ashbie Hawkins, an African-
American man. The press decried this event, claiming that there was a “Negro 
invasion” happening in the city.89 The process of blockbusting began with a 
speculative realtor selling one house in an all-white neighborhood to an African-
American buyer. Following this transaction, the presence of black residents would 
create fear in the rest of the residents who were concerned that the neighborhood was 
in decline. Realtors fed on this fear, posting advertisements meant to incentivize white 
residents to sell. They would offer top prices to the first white sellers, and after the 
neighborhood turned over racially they were able to purchase the rest of the houses at 
much lower prices.90 The eventual result was that the neighborhood would become 
completely black.  
  Between 1955 and 1965, Edmondson Village, a neighborhood west of 
Sandtown, experienced almost complete racial turnover.91 The area had been 
developed by James Keelty who began building daylight rowhouses there during the 
                                                 
89 Antero Pietila, Not in My Neighborhood: How Bigotry Shaped a Great American City (Chicago, Ivan 
R. Dee, 2010), 6.  
 
90 W. Edward Orser, “Flight to the Suburbs:  Suburbanization and Racial Change on Baltimore’s West 
Side,” in The Baltimore Book: New Views of Local History, eds. Elizabeth Fee, Linda Shopes, and 
Linda Zeidman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 221. 
 
91 W. Edward Orser, Blockbusting in Baltimore: The Edmondson Village Story (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1994), ix.  
 
  44 
1920s.92 Daylight rowhouses have a window in nearly every room, making them 
brighter and more preferable than some of the older, darker rowhouses.93 From the 
time of its earliest development through the late 1940s, Edmondson Village was an 
desirable white middle-class suburb. By the 1950s, however, suburban development 
had expanded outwards and the area became outdated. White flight accelerated during 
this time as the African-American population that had grown by twenty-five percent in 
the 1940s moved closer to the racial boundaries of neighborhoods across the city.94  
 The other response to the housing problems in black neighborhoods was urban 
renewal. The 1907 report Housing Conditions of Baltimore was the first published 
document to bring attention to the city’s housing conditions. It claimed that four 
downtown neighborhoods were overcrowded and had high rates of disease.95  In a 
1934 canvas of city housing, officials identified a “ring of blight,” which once again 
included some of the oldest housing stock in the city, all within a mile of the central 
business district (Figure 1.4). The people living in these rowhouses at the time were 
often lower-class immigrants and African-Americans from the South. The housing 
was frequently owned by absentee landlords who failed to maintain them.96 In 1937, 
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The Housing Authority of Baltimore City was founded with an $18 million budget to 
address blight in the city.97  
 
Figure 1.4. Home Owners Residential Security Map, 1937. From Sheridan Libraries 
Collections of Johns Hopkins University.  
 
 At that time, addressing blight meant the demolition of slums and the 
construction of public housing. In an area of the city west of downtown and a half mile 
north of the Mt. Clare railroad yards, the first public housing project was planned. 
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Named the Poe Homes, the house that Edgar Allen Poe lived in was the only building 
not demolished. Although there was strong opposition to demolition by the residents 
who formed a coalition asking for their neighborhood to be “reconditioned not 
destroyed,” the city planners were not convinced.98 They believed the deteriorating 
rowhouses were breeding crime and poverty. 226 rowhouses dating from the 1820s 
and 30s were destroyed as a result, and over 1,000 residents had to be relocated before 
the Poe Homes were completed.99 The Poe Homes, composed of 298 apartment units, 
opened on September 30, 1940.100 
 A similar story played out in Sandtown-Winchester where hundreds of 
rowhouses along North Mount Street and Baker Street were slated for demolition. 
Originally described as a slum clearance project, the project only received approval 
once it was instead labeled a defense housing project.101 The low-rise Gilmor Homes 
housing project took the place of hundreds of rowhouses. This project drew criticism 
not only from residents living in these houses, but also critics writing about the 
situation in the Baltimore Evening Sun. One reporter described how on the whole the 
neighborhood featured “good houses” that could be made habitable through 
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renovation.102 The 587-unit Gilmor Homes project opened in June 1942 exclusively 
for African-American families.103  
 Another component of urban renewal was highway construction. In 1944 
Baltimore hired city planner Robert Moses who created a plan to build a sunken 
expressway through the Franklin-Mulberry corridor, the center of the west-side 
‘slum.’104 The plan was an east-west highway, known as the Franklin Expressway that 
would have travelled north of the central business district through the Mount Vernon 
neighborhood, and cut through both Franklin Mulberry and Old West Baltimore. The 
project, which lawyer and activist Herbert M. Brune at the time called “a mountain of 
human misery,” would have displaced 19,000 people, cost $26 million dollars, and 
resulted in the demolition of 200 blocks.105 Though these specific plans never came to 
fruition, a modified east-west highway, Interstate 170, was constructed between 1975 
and 1979.106 This 1.4 mile stretch of road, dubbed “the highway to nowhere,” resulted 
in the demolition of 20 rowhouses and churches in West Baltimore, and displaced 
nearly 3,000 predominately African-American residents.107 This stretch of highway 
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continues to divide West Baltimore neighborhoods from neighborhoods to the south 
including downtown.  
 These instances of blockbusting, white flight, highway construction, and urban 
renewal both reflected and created the rapidly changing city. In 1950 the city’s 
population peaked at 949,708 people. Of these, over 700,000 were white. The African-
American population grew from less than 220,000 to over 400,000 between 1950 and 
1970. During this same period of time, over 200,000 whites left the city. The city lost 
eleven percent of its jobs between 1945 and 1968, but during the same time, Baltimore 
County, where many whites were moving in, saw job growth of 245 percent.108 
 On Friday April 5, 1968, the day following the assassination of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr., Baltimore became one of several cities across the country consumed 
with violent unrest. In black neighborhoods of East Baltimore, groups of residents 
began destroying businesses. A reflection of and result of the discrimination and 
displacement of black families of the most recent decades specifically, racial tensions 
reached a boiling point. The destruction of businesses was coupled with looting, and 
on Friday night the governor called for 5,500 National Guard troops to be brought in 
to support the police. On Saturday the destruction travelled to West Baltimore along 
Pennsylvania Avenue. By Monday six deaths were confirmed, 5,000 people had been 
arrested, and there were 1,200 fires. The majority of the businesses destroyed were 
white-owned, some of which had previously refused service to blacks, others that were 
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Jewish-owned.109 Criminal activity, including looting, arson, and vandalism, occurred 
almost entirely in black neighborhoods, because state troopers had cordoned off 
downtown.110 The uprising had a negative impact on several business districts that had 
already begun declining including Lombard Street and Pennsylvania Avenue.111  
 
Illustration 1.5.  National Guardsmen marching the 1900 block of Greenmount 
Avenue following riots over the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., April 7, 1968. 
Photograph by William L. LaForce Jr. for The Baltimore Sun.  
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From the Inner Harbor to the Inner City  
During the 1970s and 80s, conditions in the inner-city neighborhoods of 
Baltimore, including Sandtown-Winchester, evidenced a history of generations of 
discrimination and neglect. The economy of the city changed as a result of 
deindustrialization, changing the nature of the employment. Revitalization efforts in 
the city began downtown and near the harbor not long after the riots ended. A 
reinvigorated downtown core emerged out of the revitalization efforts, but city 
neighborhoods farther away continued to suffer from disinvestment and deterioration.  
Deindustrialization and corporate buyouts had a major effect on the city’s 
economy. During the 1970s, Bethlehem Steel employed 30,000 workers at the city’s 
plant. By 1986, fewer than 15,000 people worked for the company, and by 2009 only 
2,500 remained.112 When the American Can company merged with the National Can 
Company in 1987, the Baltimore factory that employed 2,000 people closed down.113 
On January 1, 1975, the Black & Decker plant shut down, laying off 3,700 people. 
Several other of the city’s oldest plants closed during this decade including Mount 
Vernon Mills, the Mutual Chemical bichromate plant, and the Revere & American 
Smelting & Refining Company’s smelting refineries.114 
In 1970 the city planning office issued the MetroCenter/Baltimore Technical 
Study. The results of the report concluded that the city needed to undergo massive 
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urban renewal and redevelopment in order to maintain its tax base. The report also 
suggested that in order to attract private investment, it should clean up the waterfront 
and build a distinctive skyline of skyscrapers. In order to achieve these goals, the “ring 
of blight” still needed to be demolished, and the city needed new workers. Wallace, 
McHarg, Roberts, and Todd argued for the redevelopment of five key areas in the 
city’s core: the inner harbor, the neighborhood of St. Mary’s Seminary, the Camden 
Station area, Belair Market, and Lafayette Market. They wanted to separate residential 
and commercial areas, and correct block dimensions to make them more uniform.115 
The report was all about sanitizing a city seen as beleaguered by the riots, and 
emphasized downtown redevelopment.  
 Charles Center, a project whose origins precede the MetroCenter report, was 
the experiment that catalyzed a number of downtown redevelopment projects. The 
project, created to help stop the decline of the downtown commercial district, was 
conceived by the “Committee for Downtown” whose ranks soon included developer 
James W. Rouse. The project included the construction of the Sun Life building, the 
Morris A. Mechanic theatre (demolished 2015), One and Two Charles Center office, 
apartment buildings and other structures.116  
 A continuation of the goals and ideas set forth by Charles Center was the Inner 
Harbor Plan. First proposed in 1964, the project was phased over thirty years to 
redevelop 33-acres of abandoned warehouses, docks, and other maritime and 
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industrial structures located along the harbor. While a few of these buildings were 
saved, the majority were demolished. The Inner Harbor plan idolized the idea of a 
tabula rasa, and sought to spur tourism and entertainment, two major growth 
industries. Some of its specific projects included Harborplace, the National Aquarium, 
a convention center, a science center, and a world trade center.117 
 The large downtown projects constitute most of the urban planning narrative of 
Baltimore’s 1970s and 80s; however, smaller residential projects also had a major 
impact on the city. During Mayor Donald Schaeffer’s term from 1971 to 1987, Time 
Magazine nicknamed Baltimore the “Renaissance City,” in large part because of the 
Inner Harbor projects.118 One of Schaefer’s less recognized initiatives however was 
the urban homesteading project. Modeled after the Homestead Acts that settled the 
American West, through the program abandoned houses were sold for one dollar each 
and purchasers received up to $37,000 in low-interest construction loans. The program 
started in 1973 and was a way incentivize resettlement in older neighborhoods that 
were losing population, as well as a response to the end of federal funding for the 
construction of subsidized housing. The project provided fodder for the early 
preservation movement in the city, and saved 600 houses over the course of ten years. 
By the early 1980s federal budget constraints made it so the city could no longer 
subsidize construction loans, but a project called Rehab Express tried to keep the 
concept going for buyers who could afford to finance the projects themselves. After 
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the program ended, Baltimore advised New York and Washington D.C. on how to 
execute their own programs. The success of this project reinforced the downtown 
redevelopments, and stabilized the real estate market enough so that eventually the 
city no longer had to give away houses.119 
 As projects in the city’s central core flourished, officials began to focus on 
addressing the most visible signs of failure in surrounding neighborhoods: public 
housing projects. In 1995, Baltimore demolished the six eleven-story high-rise towers 
of Lafayette Courts, a project that opened in 1955 in East Baltimore.120 It, along with 
Lexington Terrace public housing project, were among the urban renewal projects that 
had replaced ‘blighted’ neighborhoods of ‘dilapidated’ rowhouses. Lafayette Courts, 
in turn, was replaced by new low-rise public housing that adopted Baltimore’s 
traditional two-hundred-year-old building form. As planners and architects began to 
refocus on the activities of the city at the street level and design more at the human 
scale, what was old, traditional neighborhood development became new again in 
Baltimore.121  
 Not everyone believed that alterations to public housing and other 
neighborhood programs would be enough to stem the tide of decay in the city. In 
1995, David Rusk, former mayor of Albuquerque, wrote the booklet Baltimore 
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Unbound, in which he claimed that Baltimore, along with 33 other American cities, 
was “beyond the point of no return,” and could not be redeemed.122 The basis of his 
argument was that cities that could not annex their suburbs—which he called 
“inelastic cities” would not be able to financially sustain themselves.123 Framing his 
narrative from the presumption that the city is “programmed for inexorable decline” 
because of the high proportion of poor African-Americans living there, he argued for 
the deconcentration of poverty through creating rental assistance and purchase 
programs to incentivize low-income residents to move to the suburbs.124 He claimed 
that by adopting these policies, the poverty rate in the city would decrease by half, and 
there would be no high-poverty neighborhoods in the area.125   
 
Contemporary Baltimore  
 The City of Baltimore is still trying to address complex urban problems born 
from the urban crisis era of the late 20th century. While the city lost one third of its 
population between 1960 and 2000, the city is losing population at a much slower rate 
in the 21st century.126 As of 2015, the largest employers in the city were Johns 
Hopkins University and John Hopkins Hospital and Health systems, along with Under 
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Armour and the Cordish Company.127 Recent data shows that Baltimore is not only a 
relatively affluent city, ranking seventh among the largest metropolitan areas in per 
capita income, but also has a significant black middle class.128 The problem is that 
prosperity is not equally distributed across the metropolitan area, or even within the 
city itself. Nearly one quarter of Baltimore City residents live in poverty, and thirty-
five percent of children live in poverty.129 These problems have not stopped the city 
from having high aspirations, considering the 2000 Master Plan included a bid for the 
city to host the 2012 Olympic Games.130  
 The latest of Baltimore’ redevelopment plans again focuses on the harbor, this 
time on Port Covington, an industrial area south of the Federal Hill neighborhood 
along the Inner Harbor. Under Armour Chief Executive Officer Kevin Plank plans to 
redevelop the area to include offices, restaurants, housing, shopping, waterfront parks, 
and a new headquarters for his company. Administered under Plank’s real estate 
corporation Sagamore Development, Plank asked for $1.1 billion in support from 
local, state, and federal governments, including $535 million in tax-increment 
financing from the City of Baltimore. The project covers over 260 acres, and 
supporters believe it will create thousands of jobs for the city and revitalize another 
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portion of the waterfront. Critics on the other hand argue that the city is not getting the 
best deal, and that the city’s resources should be going to tackling larger problems in 
the neighborhoods, including failing schools and high crime.131 On September 28, 
2016, then Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake signed legislation that committed the city 
to using $660 million worth of taxpayer-backed bonds to help pay for infrastructure 
improvement projects for Port Covington.132  
 Today, nearly 300 years after the founding of ‘Baltimore Town’ the City of 
Baltimore continues to do whatever it can to be more prominent at both the national 
and international level. Originally a colonial port town, it grew to become an industrial 
and manufacturing center. The city tends to operate like a Northern city but think like 
a Southern one, from the time of slavery to today when racism is still a powerful force 
in the city. A place defined by the residential architecture of rowhouses, Baltimore still 
uses the building form following the fall of modernist public housing towers that never 
found their place among a city so uniform in building style. Today the city struggles to 
find the balance between keeping up with urban revitalization schemes and tending to 
the needs of neighborhoods that have been disinvested in for nearly half a century.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CHALLENGES OF COMMUNITY PLANNING:   
A REVIEW OF REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN SANDTOWN-WINCHESTER
  
Revitalization efforts in Sandtown-Winchester were introduced as soon as the 
neighborhood began to decline in the 1970s. Over the years, these efforts have been 
initiated both internally by neighborhood organizations and externally by foundations 
and nonprofit organizations. While projects have included a range of different 
programs from youth leadership to job readiness, the primary focus was housing. By 
rehabilitating vacant properties and building new affordable housing, the leaders of 
these initiatives were convinced they could stabilize and improve the conditions of the 
whole neighborhood. During the 1990s in particular, Sandtown received so much 
press as an example of urban revitalization that former President Jimmy Carter came 
to the neighborhood to work on some of the first houses in the area to be completed by 
Habitat for Humanity. A cursory glance of Sandtown today does not reveal those 
investments. The neighborhood continues to face numerous complex and interrelated 
urban problems, some of which have a stronger correlation to the vacant and 
abandoned property issue than others. A close examination of how revitalization 
efforts have been implemented in the past provides context for the solutions to 
vacancy Baltimore is pursuing today.   
This chapter discusses the history of revitalization efforts in the Sandtown-
Winchester neighborhood in the Post-World War II era. It then evaluates the 
revitalization efforts and concludes by discussing the conditions of the neighborhood 
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today. The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for the current revitalization 
schemes affecting the neighborhood.  
 
Figure 2.1. Map of the boundaries of the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood. From 
Google Maps, 2011. 
 
Revitalization Efforts in Sandtown-Winchester Post-World War II  
 By the 1950s Sandtown was in the center of the thriving African-American 
community of the city. Sandtown was also at the edge of the color line, as African-
Americans could not purchase property west of Fulton Avenue, the western boundary 
of the neighborhood. This changed in 1954 when the Banfields became the first black 
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family to cross the color line by purchasing 806 North Fulton Avenue on January 30, 
1945. In nearby Edmondson Village, blockbusting began in 1955, and over the course 
of ten years the neighborhood became nearly exclusively African-American.1 This 
migration of blacks within Baltimore was liberating in the sense that after a half-
century of being forced to live in one area of the city they now had a choice. 
Subsequently though, the unified black communities of the early 20th century began to 
disintegrate as African-Americans dispersed to other city neighborhoods and suburban 
communities.  
 Economic forces had a significant impact on Baltimore during the 1960s. The 
city’s population peaked in 1950 at 949,708, and by 1960 Baltimore had lost 10,000 
people.2 One of the many reasons the suburbs had such a powerful pull on city 
residents was that thousands of jobs moved there. Between 1955 and 1965 the city lost 
82 industries, 65 of which moved to Baltimore County.3 Between 1970 and 1980 the 
population of Baltimore saw its greatest decrease, losing 152,249 people.4  
 The 1970s was a difficult decade for the city, and particularly for Sandtown. 
The 1970 census revealed that the neighborhood had a median income below the 
federal poverty level.5 As jobs left the city, the illegal drug economy flourished in 
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neighborhoods like Sandtown. The influx of drugs increased the amount of crime and 
violence in the neighborhood, and led to more people being incarcerated.6  
 In 1977 the Sandtown-Winchester Improvement Association was organized to 
address some of the problems the neighborhood faced. It was estimated that at the time 
the neighborhood had approximately 500 vacant properties. One of the Association’s 
first activities was to lobby for urban renewal funds in order to work on rehabilitation 
projects in the neighborhood. During this period, urban renewal funds were not only 
being put towards clearance and new construction, they were also being put towards 
rehabilitation projects. In 1978 the Association obtained urban renewal status for the 
900 block of Fulton Avenue in order to receive funding to rehabilitate existing 
properties. The organization chose this area because it had one of highest rates of 
homeownership in the area, and also because they thought the high visibility of these 
properties would signal that revitalization was underway in the neighborhood.7 
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Figure 2.2. Flyer from the Sandtown-Winchester Improvement Association, 1978. 
From the Baltimore City Archives. 
 
 Another one of the early initiatives the Improvement Association pushed for 
was a housing cooperative for low-income buyers. In 1982 the Sandtown Village 
Cooperative opened as a result of receiving the desired urban renewal funds for the 
900 block of North Fulton Avenue. The city’s fourth subsidized housing co-op, it 
allowed people who purchased the houses to become the collective owners of the 
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housing complex, which consisted of rehabilitated rowhouses. This project provided 
affordable housing to neighborhood residents, and by making the owners their own 
landlords, ensured that they would not be evicted or have their rents increased. Ella 
Johnson, a housing specialist for the Improvement Association, noted that this co-op 
would help make it so that people have more of a stake in what happens in their 
neighborhood than they would if they were just renters. The co-op consisted of forty-
one units divided into apartments of one to four bedrooms, creating places suitable for 
families of different sizes. The project was paid for by a city subsidy which made it 
possible for residents to buy into the co-op for $500 down, and make monthly 
payments of between $250 and $375.8 
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Figure 2.3. Advertisement for cooperative housing on the 900 block of Fulton Avenue. 
From The Baltimore Sun, December 9, 1984. 
 
 Revitalization efforts in the neighborhood were directed by community 
members up until the late 1980s. Between 1987 and 1989 and the nonprofit 
organization Baltimore United in Leadership Development (BUILD) formed a 
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collaboration with the city’s new mayor to address problems in Sandtown. Kurt 
Schmoke became the city’s first African-American mayor in 1987. He ran on a 
platform of drug decriminalization, improving housing and education programs, and 
focusing on boosting the city’s economy.9 BUILD, a coalition of religious 
congregations, public schools, and other associations that united with the goal of 
revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods, was founded in 1977.10 The early initiatives of 
BUILD included improving police protections, improving housing, and deterring 
arsonists.11 During his mayoral campaign, Schmoke had promised to help BUILD 
construct affordable housing in Baltimore’s poorest neighborhoods.12  
 One of the first initiatives made possible from the partnership between BUILD 
and Schmoke was a $17 million “city renewal” plan announced in 1989. Funded in 
collaboration with city and state governments, the project included building 250 new 
houses in Sandtown for low-income families on Winchester Street between Gilmor 
and Carey Streets.13 The new houses were detached brick rowhouses that were in 
keeping with the existing architectural form and materials of the neighborhood.  
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 In 1988, less than a year after Schmoke became mayor, real estate developer 
James Rouse, approached Schmoke with an ambitious vision of neighborhood 
revitalization for Baltimore.14 Rouse, a Maryland native, had become well-known for 
developing festival marketplaces—shopping centers in central cities designed  to help 
revitalize downtowns. He was responsible for Faneuil Hall in Boston, Santa Monica 
Place, and had recently worked on Harborplace in Baltimore. Towards the end of his 
life, Rouse became focused on a new, socially conscious mission of creating a model 
to revitalize inner-city neighborhoods; a goal which led him to establish the Enterprise 
Foundation (now Enterprise Community Partners) in 1981.15 The purpose of the 
Enterprise Foundation was to create low-income housing through community 
organizations.16 In 1992 the Enterprise Foundation launched the Community Building 
in Partnership Initiative to transform neighborhoods in 150 cities.17 Rouse brought to 
Schmoke the idea of launching a concentrated long-term effort to completely remake 
one of the most distressed neighborhoods in the city. Initially hesitant to this idea, 
Schmoke chose to first collaborate with the Enterprise Foundation on a smaller 
project, a collaboration with BUILD to construct 300 new housing units in West 
Baltimore.18  
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 These new housing projects became known as Nehemiah Homes, named after 
the funding that created them: the Nehemiah Housing Opportunities Grant Program 
created by Congress in 1987 through the Housing and Community Development 
Act.19 Administered through the Federal Housing Administration, the Nehemiah 
Program was a loan assistance program for low-income homebuyers. This program 
offered down payment assistance to anyone who qualified for an FHA loan. The goals 
of the program were to increase homeownership in low and moderate income 
neighborhoods, improve neighborhoods in cities across the country, and increase 
employment in those neighborhoods.20 
 The first Nehemiah project constructed in West Baltimore was in the Penn 
North neighborhood north of Sandtown in March 1990. Here 73 new rowhouses were 
constructed for low-income families. Financing was made possible from both the 
federal grant, as well as special local funding. The houses were sold to families with 
annual incomes between $13,000 and $30,000, whose average monthly payment for 
the house was approximately $350. In June of the same year, the project expanded to 
the Sandtown neighborhood, where construction began on 210 new rowhouses, and 
the renovation of 17 existing.21 
In the midst of planning for the Nehemiah Homes, Schmoke came around to 
Rouse’s grand neighborhood revitalization plan. One of the reasons Sandtown became 
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the focal neighborhood is that following a 1989 new conference during which the 
mayor had announced the Nehemiah project, Sandtown residents told him that without 
curbing crime, improving schools, cleaning up the streets, and providing better 
healthcare, new housing would not make a difference.22 Between 1989 and 1990, 
Schmoke and Rouse, along with BUILD, worked to define their vision for Sandtown 
in collaboration with the community. In May 1990 over four hundred people showed 
up to a neighborhood meeting where Schmoke and others discussed potential projects. 
Over the next year community groups in Sandtown met continually, sometimes twice 
a week working on ideas and plans for their neighborhood.23  
The product of these meetings was a series of lofty goals for the transformation 
of Sandtown. Instead of only focusing on addressing a few neighborhood problems, 
Community Building in Partnership, the organization formed to carry out 
revitalization efforts, decided to tackle them all. This decision was motivated by 
Rouse, who, in 1996, vowed that “all the social and physical conditions in this 
neighborhood will be transformed over the next five years.”24 He believed that true 
neighborhood transformation could only be possible by addressing all of the problems 
comprehensively rather than piecemeal, a theory premised on the idea that poverty is 
an interconnected web.25 Thus, the initiatives in Sandtown would try to address as 
many of the root causes of neighborhood decline as possible.  
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In 1990 the Sandtown-Winchester Task Force was appointed to guide the 
planning process and included community members, BUILD, Baltimore Urban 
League, and the Enterprise Foundation. This task force was asked to create a 
neighborhood charter that would reflect what residents wanted to see happen. The 
group developed a ten-point vision statement for the neighborhood and organized 
committees to create strategies for bringing their vision to fruition. Some of the issues 
included access to healthcare, access to employment opportunities, improving schools, 
and addressing substance abuse.26  
The primary goal of the CBP, however, was to create more affordable housing 
in the neighborhood though through both the rehabilitation of existing row houses, as 
well as the construction of new buildings. Some building projects were already 
underway in the neighborhood when CBP was created. These included the renovation 
of 589 units in the Gilmor Homes public housing project, and the construction of the 
aforementioned Nehemiah Homes.  
Funding for the revitalization projects came from a number of different 
sources, both private and public. At the federal level funding from the Nehemiah 
program was provided to go towards housing initiatives.27 It is estimated that the 
Enterprise Foundation earmarked at least $30 million.28 The various congregations 
that comprised BUILD donated $100,000 to jump start housing projects.  
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At the same time that these things were going on, Sandtown’s Habitat for 
Humanity was also working on a number of projects in the neighborhood. Habitat for 
Humanity is a nonprofit organization founded in 1976, that works across the country 
and the world to create decent and affordable housing.29 The Sandtown chapter of 
Habitat for Humanity was created in 1989 by New Song Church to combat housing 
inequalities.30 The organization’s first project in the neighborhood was the 
rehabilitation of 1621 North Gilmor Street. The group bought the house for $5,000 
from a private partnership in Washington D.C. Mayor Schmoke attended the open 
house for the newly renovated structure on March 4, 1990.31  
In June 1992, former President Jimmy Carter and Rosalynn Carter volunteered 
with Sandtown Habitat to rehabilitate ten vacant houses in Sandtown.32 The Carters 
were part of Habitat’s commitment to renovate one hundred houses in the 
neighborhood, a goal that was eventually achieved in 1998.33 Houses rehabilitated by 
Sandtown are easily identifiable because each has a front facade painted a different 
pastel color. By the end of 2011, Sandtown Habitat had rehabilitated its 300th home in 
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the neighborhood.34  In 2014 Sandtown Habitat merged with Habitat for Humanity of 
the Chesapeake.35 The Chesapeake branch of the organization has been working 
across Baltimore City and County since 1982, beginning by rehabilitating vacant 
rowhouses.36 
 
Illustration 2.1. Habitat for Humanity rehabilitated rowhouses. Photograph by author, 
November 17, 2016. 
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Dissatisfaction and Disintegration  
Despite all of the investment and programs that had been introduced in the 
neighborhood, many residents did not think CBP’s work was successful. Over 400 
Sandtown residents attended a community meeting in June 1998, many of whom came 
to express their frustrations with the way that revitalization efforts were proceeding. 
Several residents expressed the feeling that they were not being adequately involved in 
the efforts. Since the majority of the funding went into building projects, residents felt 
that other issues like the rampant drug trade, drug abuse, and inadequate trash pickup, 
were being ignored.37 Residents explained that they felt as though the issues that 
mattered the most to them were not the priority of Rouse and other leaders.  
In response to these complaints, Community Building in Partnership 
reinvigorated their grassroots outreach by sending AmeriCorps volunteers out across 
the neighborhood to discuss public safety issues, one of the concerns residents felt 
were not being adequately addressed. They also started a program to bring in 
facilitators who would be able to train people who have already been singled out as 
community leaders.38 Addressing these discontents at this point in the process would 
prove to not be enough to sustain the revitalization efforts going forward. During 
Martin O’Malley’s tenure as mayor in the 2000s, his administration addressed the 
city’s crime and drug trade with zero tolerance policing policies.39 The revitalization 
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of Sandtown was not the central priority at City Hall anymore, and even if it had been, 
the money was no longer there to support it. By the mid-2000s, CBP had disbanded. 
All in all, it is estimated that somewhere between $130 to $180 million were put into 
the neighborhood over the course of about a decade.40 Whether the money promised 
was actually put towards revitalization efforts in the neighborhood remains a point of 
contention for residents.  
 
Evaluation of Revitalization Efforts  
There are several quantitative measures that suggest that Community Building 
in Partnership’s initiatives did make a difference in the neighborhood. Between 1990 
and 2009, the number of neighborhood residents living below the poverty line fell by 
8.3 percent. The owner-occupancy rate increased from 24.3 percent in 1990 to 35.6 
percent in 2009. Educational levels in the neighborhood also improved, as shown by 
the fact that 18.9 percent more people had a high school diploma in 2009 than in 1990. 
However, despite all of these positive changes, the neighborhood lost over 2,800 
residents, and unemployment increased by 3.4 percent.41 It should also be noted that 
the positive changes could have also been the result of outmigration from the 
neighborhood.  
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Some critics look at the state of the neighborhood today and write off the 
revitalization efforts as a failure. Paul Marx, one of Rouse’s biographers, called Rouse 
overly optimistic, and said of Sandtown that perhaps “some areas are too lost to be 
helped much.”42 This opinion became more widely accepted following the death of 
Freddie Gray, when policy analysts and journalists alike reexamined the revitalization 
efforts that took place in an attempt to explain the events of April 12. In 2015 Joan 
Walsh claimed that the revitalization efforts of the 1990s were meant to prevent the 
events that began with Gray’s arrest, suggesting a correlation between the failure of 
revitalization efforts and Gray’s treatment by police. 
In examining the results of the revitalization projects, it is important to note the 
lack of accounting that was carried out to detail exactly where and how the money that 
was promised was actually spent. In a report for the Abell Foundation in 2013 Stefanie 
DeLuca and Peter Rosenblatt scoured a variety of sources for information on where 
the money was invested in the neighborhood and what it produced, but found very 
little. Records do indicate that $100,000,000 was allocated for housing alone, and that 
the Enterprise Foundation invested $30,000,000, though what for, is unclear. While 
there is evidence that midway through the project millions of dollars were put towards 
building repairs in Sandtown and other neighborhoods, many such repairs were either 
faulty or never fully completed.43 Considering this lapse in reported accounting, any 
assessment of the success or failure of the project should not assume that the estimated 
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$130 to $180 million that was earmarked for the project was spent, or was spent on 
what was promised.  
One of the major critiques of how the project was executed was that it was top 
down—that the project was driven solely by an ambitious mayor and a wealthy 
developer. In spite of all of the community meetings and the employment of hundreds 
of residents as block captains and outreach workers, some residents still did not feel 
that they had ownership over the projects, or that their voices were being heard in 
what they wanted to see happen in their neighborhood.44 Early on in the process 
BUILD was a major partner in the project, and they emphasized that neighborhood 
transformation could only occur if residents were taught leadership and political 
organizing skills. BUILD believed that this was the most important thing to invest 
money in. When the Enterprise Foundation came on the scene, their leaders 
recognized the importance of teaching residents those skills, but were convinced that 
housing was more important and would be the focus of their efforts. One of the 
reasons for this is that improved housing is a visible symbol of neighborhood 
improvement, whereas empowered neighborhood leaders are not. Many remarked that 
the CBP failed to create capacity in the community, leading to a sense of distrust 
between residents and organizers.45 
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As a result, leaders of the initiatives in Sandtown thought that the community 
structures were weak, so they implemented their own intermediate organizations to 
effect change. They too failed to build capacity in the existing leaders and 
organizations of the neighborhood. Instead of viewing community capacity as a key 
result they wanted to see come out of their efforts, CBP took a course that they 
thought would get faster results for their other goals.46 This strategy was one of many 
decisions that ended up limiting the long-term impact of the programs.  
While leaders of the project initially committed to using a holistic approach to 
solve more than one of the neighborhood’s problems simultaneously, some critics 
claim that the majority of the project was focused on housing. It was noted that only 
after the housing was completed would residents approach Rouse and in one way or 
another remark “This house is very nice but I have no job.”47 However, one of the 
reasons that housing did become the predominant focus of the project was that there 
was funding to support it both at the federal and state level. While this happened, other 
promises such as new parks and open space, a recreation center, not to mention issues 
such as crime and job training, fell further down the list of priorities.48 
There were a number of problems with the premises of Community Building in 
Partnership’s strategies. One of CBP’s strategies was to stem population loss in the 
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neighborhood by creating affordable housing. By failing to either accept or address the 
problem of lack of well-paying jobs for working class residents, though, CBP actually 
created an excess of affordable housing that remained out of reach for many 
underemployed and unemployed individuals. Leaders of these initiatives continued to 
create affordable housing even as the neighborhood lost population. By ignoring 
demographic statistics, the CBP inadvertently started creating more vacant properties 
instead of eliminating them.  
Despite their efforts, CBP was also unable to help residents get a good enough 
paying job to be able to afford the housing they were creating. In the 1990s eighteen 
percent of Sandtown residents were unemployed.49 The CBP was able make some 
difference in this area, through a training program called Jobs-Plus.50 In addition to 
that, over three hundred people were able to secure jobs through a program called 
Sandtown Works.51 In spite of the progress made in this area in 1990s, by 2009 the 
unemployment rate had increased to twenty-one percent.52 If creating good paying 
jobs in and around the neighborhood had been their first priority, however, they might 
have been able to retain more residents, who would then be able to afford to purchase 
the new housing units.  
When CBP closed, the neighborhood lost more than an organizing committee. 
As described by Doni Glover, a local radio host who grew up in the neighborhood,  
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When the Sandtown-Winchester Transformation Project, known 
as Community Building in Partnership Inc., finally closed down, this 
community — of which I call home — began to lose all of the very 
resources that were changing things around for many people. Not only 
did we lose CBP, we lost our community newspaper, a senior center, an 
AmeriCorps Program, a job placement office, a high blood pressure 
program sponsored by Johns Hopkins well as a couple community 
development corporations. We also lost a program that addressed vacant 
properties. All of these programs are gone with the wind.53 
 
The closing of CBP had far reaching consequences for a host of other programs that 
were helping people in the neighborhood. Losing all of these programs within such a 
short timeframe undoubtedly negatively impacted the lives of residents who used 
them.  
Another major critique of the project is that it was too ambitious. Rouse, who 
was accustomed to tackling large projects as a real estate developer, failed to gauge 
the size of the project he was taking on in Sandtown. Rouse had initially considered 
working in another neighborhood in East Baltimore close to Johns Hopkins 
University. Governor Schaefer advised Rouse to choose that area because he thought 
that Sandtown had suffered from too much decline to rebound. By contrast, Rouse was 
convinced that in order to have the greatest impact he would have to work in a 
struggling area like Sandtown. In a letter to one of his advisers he explained that “For 
the demonstration to have meaning—to prove that there are important answers—it 
must involve a neighborhood that is really bad, tough to change.”54 The transformation 
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of Sandtown-Winchester was meant to be the showpiece of his career, his chance to 
prove that it was possible with the right organizations and right methods to completely 
rejuvenate one of the poorest neighborhoods in the city. 
Though Rouse and Schmoke both had good intentions in pursuing these 
efforts, for both of them the project became a way for each to strengthen their 
respective careers. For Schmoke, who had his sights set on Sandtown even before he 
got elected, the project was meant to show that he could, after years of neglect by 
white mayors of West Baltimore, become the first black mayor and prove how 
committed he was to inner city neighborhoods. Rouse was attempting to finish his 
career with a signature socially-conscious project that would add diversify his 
portfolio of projects. The fact that both of these men had a stake in the outcome of the 
projects could have been contributing factors to why they tried to rush things along in 
order to try and achieve the results they wanted as quickly as possible. Turning 
Sandtown into a tool for gaining personal success, however, did not result in real 
changes for the people who lived in the neighborhood.55 Rouse was incredibly 
involved in conversations with the community, but often found himself growing 
impatient with the pace of the process. His tendency to rush everyone along actually 
ended up stalling planning process.56 Ultimately, Rouse and Schmoke let the image of 
the project become more important than the results.  
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Other factors contributed to the downfall of the revitalization projects, 
including Rouse’s death in 1996.57 Between 2004 and 2008 over $1.8 million was cut 
from Housing and Urban Development programs including affordable housing 
assistance programs.58 The O’Malley administration focused on drug criminalization 
and increased policing, and the revitalization of Sandtown was not the priority.59 
Without the investment at the federal level, and the commitment of the city’s mayor, 
the housing movement quickly lost much of the momentum that it previously had.  
The death of Allan Tibbels, according to longtime Sandtown resident William 
Scipio, was another major blow to the neighborhood.60 Tibbel, a native of Baltimore 
County, moved to Sandtown in 1986 because he felt called to make a difference in the 
city. Tibbels, his wife Susan, and friend Mark Gornik founded Sandtown Habitat for 
Humanity. They also started New Song Academy grade school and the New Song 
Community Learning Center, both of which remain important neighborhood 
institutions.61 Tibbels was known as the backbone of the community and regarded by 
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many neighbors as a hero. As explained by Scipio, after his death the community lost 
a lot of momentum, despite the fact that many residents had vowed to uphold his 
legacy.62  
The racial climate of the nation should also be taken into consideration when 
examining the execution of the revitalization efforts. Following the Rodney King riots 
in 1992, racial tensions became even more magnified in inner-city neighborhoods 
across the nation. The sudden and intensive interest the Enterprise Foundation took in 
the neighborhood was met with distrust and skepticism by some residents who did not 
want a group of majority white, middle-class people to come into their neighborhood 
and direct their lives. One of the earliest projects undertaken in Sandtown was the 
restoration of a mural that depicted African-American leaders. While this project was 
underway,  a few residents sketched an alternate mural that depicted Rouse as a 
southern plantation owner and the residents as his slaves.63 This story illustrates that 
overcoming the distrust between residents and organizers would have taken more than 
a few meetings and new housing.  
 The positive changes that came out of the revitalization efforts in the short-
term cannot be overlooked. The education level of the neighborhood increased, teen 
pregnancy rates decreased, more residents became homeowners, and hundreds of 
housing units were either built or rehabilitated. The fruits of some of these efforts are 
still evident in the neighborhood today, whether through the brightly painted facades 
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of the Habitat for Humanity rowhouses, or the fact that many of the homeowners in 
the neighborhood today were only able to buy a house as a result of the programs of 
the 1990s. As explained by Chickie Grayson, president of Enterprise Homes of the 
Enterprise Foundation, “It gave 542 families the opportunity to own their own home, 
to have a mortgage they could sustain.…There are houses to show for it, and people 
are taking care of their homes.”64 It is undoubtable that despite some of it 
shortcomings and lack of sustainability, CBP’s efforts did have a positive impact on 
the neighborhood.  
 The series of factors that contributed to the lack of sustained change in 
Sandtown cannot be blamed on one person, organization, or circumstance. The 
reversal of momentum that occurred was a result of a combination of factors, 
including the failure to train new leaders, lack of community engagement, a change in 
the political climate, and the death of community leaders. The decline of the 
neighborhood post-2000 contributed to the loss of population and increase in vacancy 
rates that the area still suffers from today.  
 
The State of Sandtown Today 
 Today, Sandtown-Winchester is a 72-block neighborhood in the northwest area 
of the city. It has a population of approximately 8,500. 96.6 percent of residents are 
African-American.65 Half of children in the neighborhood live below the poverty line, 
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and a quarter of adults are unemployed. Only one in twenty residents has had any 
college education.66 The homicide rate is more than double the citywide average.67 In 
2015 the neighborhood had the highest rates of incarceration of any census tract in the 
state of Maryland.68 One in ten residents are on parole or on probation.69  
 It is estimated that there are approximately 848 vacant buildings in Sandtown-
Winchester.70 Many vacant properties exist within fully intact blocks, while others 
stand on hollowed out streets. For example, on the east side of North Gilmor Street 
between Baker and School Streets, there is a block of fully intact two-story rowhouses 
with only one vacant property. A few blocks away on North Bruce Street between 
Baker and Lorman, however, the street has been completely cleared leaving grassy 
lots abutting houses on the next streets over. Some blocks have half occupied, half 
vacant housing, others have gaps between rowhouses where tear downs occurred. The 
neighborhood has a patchwork appearance that is continually in flux as demolitions 
continue to occur and vacancy rates increase.  
 During the protests of late April 2015, significant property damage was done to 
some of the neighborhood’s businesses. One such business that was burned was the 
                                                 
66 Lawrence Lanahan, “Who Can Save Sandtown?” Urbanite Baltimore, accessed January 8, 2017, 
http://www.urbanitebaltimore.com/100/who-can-save-sandtown/#sthash.cupaUvyk.dpbs. 
 
67 Yvonne Wenger, “Saving Sandtown-Winchester: decade-long, multimillion-dollar investment 
questioned.”  
 
68 Justin Fenton, “Report: Sandtown-Winchester leads state in number of people incarcerated,” 
Baltimore Sun, February 25, 2015.  
 
69 William Scipio in discussion with the author, November 2016.  
 
70 See Baltimore CityView, http://cityview.baltimorecity.gov/. 
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Hae Tteuneum Market, a corner store at the intersection of Baker and Mount Streets, 
just across the street from the Gilmor Homes where Gray was arrested. The business 
was one of three convenience stores in the neighborhood owned by Korean immigrant 
Grace Lyo. This particular property of Lyo’s was uninsured, but in June 2015 she 
stated that she planned to rebuild and reopen.71 As of November 2016, the building 
remained a burned, hollowed-out shell with the sign on the wall the only remaining 
part of the market. Despite the damages that this and other businesses sustained, the 
neighborhood took immediate and active response to cleaning up after the protests. 
According to Scipio, dozens of residents and outsiders alike were in the streets in the 
days following helping to clean-up the wreckage.  
 
Illustration 2.2 Hae Tteunuem Market with existing damage from the riots of April 
2015. Photograph by author, November 17, 2016.  
                                                 
71 Jean Marbella, “Korean-American merchants face hurdles in rebuilding after Baltimore riot,” 
Baltimore Sun, June 13, 2015.  
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 There are organizations that continue to work on revitalization in Sandtown, 
though without the funding that was present in the 1990s. Resident Action Committee 
is a neighborhood advocacy organization that works to empower residents to make 
positive changes in the community. It is a member of the No Boundaries Coalition of 
Central West Baltimore, an alliance between several West Baltimore neighborhood 
organizations that brings residents of these areas together to discuss and address issues 
related to racial and economic discrimination and disparities. Some of the work they 
do includes advocacy campaigns, walking tours, block parties, public art projects, and 
leadership development. Habitat for Humanity of the Chesapeake continues to work in 
the neighborhood, and advertises their services by stretching banners across vacant 
properties. The neighborhood is home to over ten churches, nearly all of which have 
social services of some kind including after-school care and food pantries. Sarah’s 
Hope, Baltimore’s largest homeless shelter (operated by St. Vincent DePaul), opened 
a larger, newly renovated facility in 2015.72 
 A recent transportation project that was slated to improve service in the area 
could have had a positive effect on the neighborhood. Currently the area is served by 
one metro station along the eastern boundary of the neighborhood, the Penn North 
Station at Pennsylvania and North Avenues. The neighborhood is also serviced by 
three local bus routes. In the late 2000s, a new 14.1 mile east-west light rail line was 
planned to travel from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in Baltimore 
                                                 
72 Yvonne Wenger, “Sarah’s Hope shelter doubles in size to serve homeless families,” Baltimore Sun, 
October 8, 2015.  
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County, east through Sandtown and Harlem Park to the Bayview MARC Station in 
Baltimore City.73 This highly anticipated $2.9 billion investment was designed to 
improve the public transportation systems within the city and help connect city 
residents with county jobs.74 Baltimore Heritage, the city’s nonprofit historic 
preservation organization, with the financial support of the Baltimore City Department 
of Transportation, the Red Line Office, and the Maryland State Highway 
Administration, developed a series of brochures that told the history of the 
neighborhoods through which the line was to travel, as well as maps that pinpointed 
and described historic sites located along the red line.75 Thus, this new light rail line 
would have provided more than just a ride, it would have brought public history to the 
attention of users. However, in June 2015 Governor Hogan cancelled the plan, citing 
the high costs of construction.76 This move was highly criticized for wasting millions 
of dollars the state had spent on planning for the line, as well as for taking an 
opportunity away from predominately African-American communities in West 
Baltimore.77 So controversial was this decision that civil rights groups and citizens in 
the city coalesced to file a complaint that petitions the U.S. Department of 
                                                 
73 Fern Shen, “Residents, civil rights groups sue state over Red Line cancellation,” Baltimore Brew, 
December 21, 2015, https://baltimorebrew.com/2015/12/21/residents-civil-right-groups-sue-state-over-
red-line-cancellation/.  
 
74 Michael Dresser and Luke Broadwater, “Hogan says no to Red Line, yes to Purple,” Baltimore Sun, 
June 25, 2015.  
 
75 Eli Pousson, in discussion with the author, November 2016.  
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June 30, 2015, https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/hogan-maryland-purple-line-no-red-line-baltimore.  
 
  86 
Transportation to investigate whether the state’s decision violates federal law, since 
Hogan instead chose to invest state money in another light rail line in a part of the 
state with a higher white population.78 The result is that along with all of the other 
resources that the neighborhood lacks, the status quo of poor transportation remains.  
 The Sandtown-Winchester Transformation Initiative was a well-intentioned 
project that created at least some short-term change in the neighborhood. It helped 
create affordable housing in the neighborhood and connected people with jobs. 
However, the project’s failure to create long-term change in the neighborhood 
provides important lessons for Baltimore. One of CBP’s major downfalls was that 
they became too focused on a singular issue: housing. Focusing on this alone meant 
that other important issues were ignored. Similarly, today Project C.O.R.E. attempts to 
address one issue: vacant housing. As important as the built environment is, merely 
altering it cannot bring about long-lasting change for neighborhood residents. The lack 
of sustained change in Sandtown has to a certain extent poisoned the relationship that 
the neighborhood has with the city, making residents more hesitant to trust any plan or 
scheme introduced that is meant to ‘improve’ their community.
                                                 
78 Fern Shen, “Residents, civil rights groups sue state over Red Line cancellation,” Baltimore Brew, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 RIGHTSIZING HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RELATION TO 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION  
For decades, Baltimore policy-makers have been implementing urban policies 
and programs based on a growth paradigm. These policies and reinvestment strategies 
were designed to promote neighborhood revitalization by stabilizing select areas and 
spurring growth in others. Baltimore has shifted to a shrinking cities mindset, and is 
now pursuing demolition as its primary urban policy. Rightsizing is an urban policy 
inspired by ideas that emerged in the late 1970s which has only recently become 
central to planning in legacy cities. It is the basis of the Project C.O.R.E. initiative, 
which seeks to eliminate vacancy in some of the most distressed housing markets in 
the city through widespread demolition. In response to concerns that this policy would 
result in the loss of historic resources, historic preservation advocates have inserted 
themselves in conversations about rightsizing and have begun to advise cities about 
how to carry out the policy while being mindful of historic resources and 
neighborhoods. Largely heralded by cities as having a positive impact on eliminating 
blight in urban landscapes, recent research suggests that rightsizing is having a 
negative impact on low-income communities in terms of social isolation and economic 
stability. Without substantial evidence to prove that rightsizing is a successful strategy 
for shrinking cities, blindly implementing it as urban policy will be damaging for 
Baltimore.  
 This chapter discusses the history of rightsizing as planning theory and 
practice. Next it discusses how rightsizing policies were first implemented in 
  88 
American cities. It then includes a literature review of rightsizing and a review of the 
major problems with the theory. It concludes with a discussion of how historic 
preservation has become involved in rightsizing policy discussions. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide context to the theory behind Project C.O.R.E.  
 
Origins of Rightsizing  
 Rightsizing has been defined numerous ways by both scholars and 
practitioners. One of the most exhaustive definitions comes from Joseph Schilling, 
founder of the Vacant Properties Research Network, and Jonathan Logan, who define 
rightsizing as “stabilizing dysfunctional markets and distressed neighborhoods by 
more closely aligning a city’s built environment with the needs of existing and 
foreseeable future populations by adjusting the amount of land available for 
development.”1 Planning professors Deborah E. and Frank J. Popper note that “smart 
decline requires thinking about who and what remains,” and may include 
“reorganizing or “eliminating” some city services, and changing land uses.2 The 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, an independent federal agency defines 
rightsizing as a “process through which legacy cities address significant physical and 
social changes to undergo a reduction to an optimal size.”3 The common thread of all 
                                                 
1 Joseph Schilling and Jonathan Logan, “Greening the rust belt: a green infrastructure model for 
rightsizing American cities,” Journal of the American Planning Association 74, no. 4 (2008): 452.  
 
2 Deborah E. Popper and Frank J. Popper, “Small can be beautiful: Coming to terms with decline,” 
Planning 68, no. 7: 21-22. 
 
3 “Managing Change: Rightsizing and Preservation in America,” The Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, 2014, accessed March 19, 2017, v, 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/achp_rightsizing_report_030514.pdf.  
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of these definitions is that rightsizing involves adjusting the size of a city’s footprint 
and built environment in order to better address the size and needs of the current and 
projected population.  
 Rightsizing arose as a response to the challenges faced by legacy cities. 
Although cities have been losing population since 1950, many city planners and other 
government officials in those cities acknowledge that shrinkage is the new normal, and 
that planning should be carried out with the idea that decline will continue to some 
degree. In the face of challenges associated with declining populations, including a 
smaller tax base, an abundance of vacant properties, and a depressed real estate 
market, rightsizing has emerged as a way to reduce the number of vacant and 
abandoned properties in cities, and to force cities to direct investment money in select 
areas.  
Rightsizing represents a major shift in urban planning. Mid-20th century urban 
renewal schemes were implemented based on concerns about the state of inner cities, 
but still emphasized population growth. Widespread demolition occurred for the sake 
of clearing land for new developments, not because cities had accepted the fact that 
they were losing population. Following large-scale urban renewal projects, the Urban 
Development Action Grants program was introduced. Administered by the federal 
government’s Department of Housing and Urban Development, the program started in 
1977 and provided $5 billion over the course of 11 years to revitalize distressed urban 
neighborhoods.4 The program was decried by preservationists as the “new urban 
                                                 
4 Ingrid W. Reed, “The Life and Death of UDAG: An Assessment Based on Eight Projects in Five New 
Jersey Cities,” Publius 19, no. 3 (1989): 93.  
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renewal.”5 Downtown revitalization plans of the 1980s and 1990s focused on 
“bringing people back to the inner city.”6 After decades of strategies that emphasized 
attracting people to cities and retaining city residents, rightsizing emphasized planning 
for continued population loss.     
 The first acknowledgements that decline may be the inevitable future of cities 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1976 Roger Starr asserted in the New 
York Times that “If the city is to survive with a smaller population, the population 
must be encouraged to concentrate itself in the sections that remain alive.”7 Starr, 
administrator of New York City’s Housing and Development Administration from 
1974 to 1976, advocated for federal housing subsidies to incentivize people to move 
out of depopulated neighborhoods, and for cities to cut off all services to these areas, 
effectively letting them die. It was understood that letting certain sections of the city 
that had faced the greatest decline die out would save the city money and allow it to 
focus its resources elsewhere.8 
 This idea that Starr first articulated is known as triage, a medical term used to 
describe how to assign degrees of urgency to injuries. In the context of cities, triage 
means planning for shrinkage by selecting areas of the city that are the most logical 
places to concentrate resources. The idea behind this strategy is that it is necessary to 
                                                 
5 Ann Satterthwaite, “UDAG: Is it the new urban renewal? Preservation News 19, no. 12 (1979): 1.  
 
6 Michael A. Tomlan, Historic Preservation: Caring for our Expanding Legacy, (New York: Springer 
International Publishing, 2015), 83. 
 
7 Roger Starr, “Making New York Smaller,” New York Times, November 14, 1976.  
 
8 Ibid.  
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exclude services from certain areas of the city despite their need for them because the 
need is so high in these areas that no amount of services would be sufficient enough to 
make enough of a difference. The result of the implementation of these concepts 
would be to increase the efficiency of the city both by saving money, and by being 
able to “save” neighborhoods that might otherwise decline if not for a stronger 
investment in city services and programs. In theory, by planning for what Starr 
determined to be inevitable—shrinkage—cities would not squander resources in areas 
that were presumed to have lost the capacity to ever thrive again.9 
 The concept of triage in city planning was more fully explored in a 1982 piece 
in Social Policy, where the authors describe the four possible types of triage that could 
happen in cities. The first form of triage directs public resources non-geographically, 
but which could result in certain geographic areas from being cut off.10 Triage II 
focuses on distributing services based on location, but not by favoring certain 
locations over others. Triage III delineates between census tracts to determine where 
resources will be distributed. For instance, areas with high levels of abandoned 
buildings would not be given funding, while other more stable tracts would have 
priority to receive funding. In Triage IV, more specific geographic areas are given 
priority for the distribution of goods and services. All of these strategies except for 
Triage I are designed with a specific result in mind.11 
                                                 
9 Peter Marcuse, Peter Medoff, and Andrea Pereira, “Triage as Urban Policy,” Social Policy 12, no. 3, 
(1982): 34.  
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Ibid., 35.   
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 During the post-urban crisis era of the 1970s-1990s when these ideas were 
introduced, cities in decline continued to plan for renewal. In this time period 
demolition remained an ad hoc strategy that addressed vacancy in piecemeal fashion. 
For example, in Baltimore, demolitions most likely occurred as a result of citizen 
complaints about a vacant property in a neighborhood. There is no documentation of 
any city during this time period including demolition as part of overreaching citywide 
planning or policy.  
This policy strategy represented a paradigm shift in urban planning because 
previously theories of planning were oriented towards growth trajectories. Growth for 
cities in population meant growth in tax revenue and economic activity. Planning was 
oriented towards the positive, and growth was always a point of pride for cities. 
Acknowledging decline was detrimental to the image of many cities, particularly ones 
that had experienced so much growth over the course of the early 20th century. 
Planning for current and future decline instead of growth became a new challenge for 
cities.   
 
Early Implementation of Rightsizing Policies  
Although the theory was introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, cities 
did not begin implementing rightsizing policies until the mid to late 2000s. The first 
city to pursue rightsizing policies was New Orleans. In the first five years following 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana, the city lost 30,000 people.12  The city 
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had been losing population prior to the hurricane; the 1960 population of the city was 
627,525, and by 2005 it was 452,170.13 Despite the horror of the effects that the 
massive flooding and damage had on the city, some viewed the city post-Katrina with 
new optimism, describing it as a “blank slate” that should be downsized in order to 
both address blight, and “reduce the risk from future flooding.14 Flooding damaged 
134,000 housing units, which comprised 70 percent of the city’s occupied housing at 
the time.15 In response to these challenges, New Orleans officials pursued rightsizing 
as a way to create more dense neighborhoods in a smaller area.16  
An early response to addressing the massive and immediate outflux of 
residents was the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOBC), a group appointed 
by Mayor Nagin that represented the diversity of the city. BNOBC advised the city to 
consolidate residential areas, and evaluate neighborhood viability based on the number 
of residents who return to their properties. BNOBC sought to restrict redevelopment in 
certain areas, fearing that “partial rebuilding” in various parts of the city would create 
redeveloped areas surrounded by blight.17 In January 2006 they unveiled plans for the 
                                                 
12 Allison Plyer, “Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans neighborhoods,” Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center, February 5, 2011, accessed March 19, 2017, 
https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/GNOCDC_PopulationLossAndVacantHousingInNewOrleans
Neighborhoods.pdf. 
 
13 Renia Ehrenfeucht and Marla Nelson, “Recovery in a Shrinking City: Challenges to Rightsizing Post-
Katrina New Orleans,” in The City After Abandonement, eds. Margaret Dewar and June Manning 
Thomas, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 137.  
 
14 Ibid., 141.  
 
15 Ibid., 134.  
 
16 Ibid., 133.  
 
17 Ibid., 141.  
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city that featured a map where residential neighborhoods that would be turned into 
parkland instead of rehabilitated were covered by a green dot. This map, along with 
accompanying plans, sparked outrage from residents who viewed this proposal as 
forced displacement. According to Ehrenfeucht and Nelson, the BNOBC failed to 
make the planning process inclusive, and did not initially have alternative plans or 
responses to concerned residents.18 
 
 
Figure 3.1. A recreation of the ‘green dot map.’ By Dan Swenson for The Times-
Picayune, April 21, 2015. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Renia Ehrenfeucht and Marla Nelson, “Recovery in a Shrinking City: Challenges to Rightsizing Post-
Katrina New Orleans,” in The City After Abandonement, eds. Margaret Dewar and June Manning 
Thomas, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 142.  
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Youngstown, Ohio became the first city to adopt policies of shrinkage into its 
comprehensive planning strategy with the Youngstown 2010 plan. Unveiled in 2005, 
the plan set forth a vision of renewing the post-industrial city that would be smaller 
both in population and in physical size. It featured a chapter called “Citywide 
Conditions,” that explained how Youngstown’s population loss had affected the plan. 
The city lost over half of its population between 1960 and 2000, and in 2000 had 
3,325 vacant housing units, which amounts to more than a 15 percent total vacancy 
rate.19 A major component of this chapter is a map overlay that aligns “high structure 
index problems” with areas of low-density, designating sections of four neighborhoods 
deemed to be “beyond any hope of short-term solutions.”20 The plan called for a thirty 
percent decrease in land intended for industrial uses.21 It also called for focusing 
revitalization efforts along commercial corridors that receive the most activity due to 
their location.22  
When it was announced, the city’s plan received considerable national media 
attention. In December 2006, the plan was reviewed in New York Times Magazine in a 
piece titled “Creative Shrinkage,” where it was proclaimed as a way to create a new 
identity for the city. Author Belinda Lanks called Youngstown’s experiment a “new 
                                                 
19 “The Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan,” City of Youngstown, 2005, accessed February 7, 2017, 31,  
http://www.cityofyoungstownoh.com/about_youngstown/youngstown_2010/plan/final_plan/Ytown201
0_chapter4.pdf. 
 
20 Ibid., 35. 
 
21 Ibid., 50.  
 
22 Ibid., 52.  
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solution” for “rock bottom” cities.23 At the time the Christian Science Monitor 
reviewed the plan in 2009, none of the residents had taken the $50,000 incentive to 
move out of disinvested areas so that whole neighborhoods could be razed. The 
Monitor called the plan “groundbreaking,” and noted its influence on other cities who 
looked at adopting similar plans, such as Flint and Buffalo.24 In 2006 the city won the 
National Planning Excellence Award for Community Outreach from the National 
Planning Association.25  
Youngstown was the first city that made it acceptable to admit that it was 
shrinking, and was not likely to regain the population it had lost. This radical 
proclamation influenced the planning of other cities. In 2000 Buffalo had 
approximately 23,000 vacant housing units. The Blueprint Buffalo Plan of 2006 
described the city’s challenge as “how to readjust or “rightsize”” the physical and built 
environment so that it better aligns with the current and projected population.26 
Between 1995 and the publication of the report, Buffalo had spent more than 30 
million dollars to demolish more than 4,500 vacant buildings.27 In 2014 the Detroit 
                                                 
23 Belinda Lanks, “Creative Shrinkage,” New York Times Magazine, December 10, 2006.  
 
24 Jeremy Kutner, “A Rust Belt city tries to shrink its way to success,” Christian Science Monitor, May 
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26 “Blueprint Buffalo: Regional strategies and local tools for reclaiming vacant properties in the city and 
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Blight Removal Task Force released a report that outlined the city’s intent to demolish 
86,000 buildings. At this point Detroit had already demolished thousands of buildings 
and was one of the most well-recognized shrinking cities.28 
 The City of Philadelphia was another early leader in rightsizing. In 2001 the 
city started the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI), a plan to address the 
city’s vacant building problem. In 1999 the city had at least 27,000 vacant 
properties.29 From 2001 to 2007 the city demolished 5,657 vacant buildings at a cost 
of $306.7 million raised through bond sales.30 The locations of demolitions were 
determined through the creation of a housing market analysis map that rated the 
housing market of every neighborhood, classifying them into six categories. This map 
was created by The Reinvestment Fund, a community development financial 
institution (CDFI) started in Philadelphia in 1985 that along with providing loans and 
financial assistance for housing also completes data research and analysis. The 
Reinvestment Fund was brought to Baltimore in 2006 to help reverse the decline 
Oliver neighborhood in East Baltimore.31 
The primary impediment to NTI’s success was the fact that the initiative 
focused solely on blight removal, and did not include plans for redevelopment. As a 
                                                 
28 “Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Plan,” Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, 2014.  
 
29 Brent D. Ryan, Design After Decline: How America Rebuilds Shrinking Cities, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 179-180.  
 
30 Ibid., 180.  
 
31 “The Reinvestment Fund at 30: Insights and New Directions,” Cascade No. 89, Fall 2015, 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/cascade/89/04_the-
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result, the city was left with thousands of vacant lots that had the effect of depressing 
surrounding land values. Brent D. Ryan described this lack of vision “doubly costly,” 
because without a strategic plan for how vacant parcels would be used post-
demolitions, the results differed little from parcel-by-parcel demolition programs of 
the previous century.32 In failing to demolish whole blocks that would create large 
areas of land that would attract new development, demolitions occurred piecemeal and 
created pockets of vacant lots situated between remaining buildings. As he notes, 
demolition did not create strategies for depressed neighborhoods, nor did it “create 
development markets where there had been none before.”33  
 In 2007 the National Vacant Properties Campaign convened the Reclaiming 
Vacant Properties: Strategies for Rebuilding America’s Neighborhoods conference in 
Pittsburgh. The conference was reportedly the first national conference centered on 
vacant and abandoned properties. Out of this came a report that outlined the process 
and planning strategies for rightsizing, including tools for planners and officials to use 
to implement these ideas. The conference included policy makers, planning 
practitioners, academics, and others from shrinking cities across the country who 
participated in a policy charrette that led to the creation of preliminary action plan.34  
                                                 
32 Brent D. Ryan, Design After Decline: How America Rebuilds Shrinking Cities, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 182.  
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34 “Right Sizing America’s Shrinking Cities: Results of the Policy Charrette and Model Action Plan,” 
National Vacant Properties Campaign (Center for Community Progress), September 2007, 2, 
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 In 2010 the Center for Community Progress started, building off of the work of 
both the National Vacant Properties Campaign and the Genesee Institute.35 The Center 
for Community Progress is a nonprofit organization “dedicated to building a future in 
which vacant and abandoned properties no longer exist.”36 Its three areas of impact are 
in Technical Assistance, Leadership & Education, and Policy & Research. Technical 
assistance is provided by the organization’s consultants, who provide communities 
with information about vacant property maintenance and reuse strategies including 
land banking, strategic code enforcement, and property data collection and 
management practices among others.37 Leadership and Education initiatives are 
administered through two key programs—the Reclaiming Vacant Properties 
Conference, and the Community Progress and Leadership Institute.38 The Center also 
conducts policy research to determine best practices for vacant property 
management.39 
 Though rightsizing has gained popularity as a planning policy, not every 
shrinking city has accepted it as the best strategy to address its problems. In February 
2017 the city of Akron, Ohio released a report entitled “Planning to Grow Akron.” 
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This plan rejects the predominant declining cities narrative, and instead focuses on 
efforts to increase the city’s tax base, and attract new residents. In pursuit of this 
ambitious plan, the city describes utilizing strategies to promote private investment, 
through both Community Reinvestment Areas and Property Tax Abatements, and 
maintaining neighborhoods and current housing stock.40 Planning and development 
director and author of the report Jason Segedy rejected the perceived notion that the 
city should plan for shrinkage saying “a shrinking cities model of mothballing 
infrastructure and relocating residents will not serve us well. Instead of putting 
precious time, energy, and money into shrinking, let’s build on our neighborhood 
assets, and figure out how to grow again.”41 The city hopes to grow from its current 
population of 198,000 to 250,000 people by 2050.42 In the same way that 
Youngstown’s plan to shrink was a radical notion over ten years ago, today Akron’s 
refusal to plan for shrinkage despite the challenges it faces is almost as equally 
extremist.  
 
Literature on Rightsizing Policies  
 For over a decade scholars have been reviewing and debating the theory of 
rightsizing, its implementation, and to a lesser degree, its effects. This section reviews 
the work of a few key authors whose writing continues to frame discussions around 
                                                 
40 Jason Segedy, “Planning to grow Akron,” City of Akron, 2017, 24, 
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rightsizing. Its purpose is to explain how rightsizing has been discussed as a planning 
policy in academia in order to understand how the theory is perceived among planners 
and scholars.  
 In 1995 Witold Rybczynski, architect and author, wrote a piece for The 
Atlantic titled “Downsizing Cities,” in which he advocated for cities to become 
smaller.43 The piece was one of the first times since the late 1970s that shrinkage for 
cities had been introduced in popular discourse. He describes shrinking cities as an 
increasingly common phenomenon that only downsizing can solve. Rybczynski 
echoed the conclusions of Starr, and wrote that cities need to choose which 
neighborhoods are viable, and that people should be relocated out of highly distressed 
neighborhoods to allow for widespread clearance to occur in those areas.  
Acknowledging that the neighborhoods most likely to be affected by these policies 
would be minority neighborhoods, he noted “Much would depend on the ability of 
minority leaders to see that given the lack of real alternatives, abandoning half-empty 
neighborhoods is not necessarily a political defeat.”44 This suggests his belief that 
revitalizing lower-income, minority neighborhoods is more of a political show than an 
achievable goal. He also claimed that what we now describe as rightsizing policies are 
no more heartless than “providing services to many poor and depopulated 
neighborhoods, which are occasionally half revived with community-development 
projects and then left on their own to decay even further.” He ends by noting that these 
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policies cannot, on their own, “solve the problem of unemployment and urban 
poverty.”45 
Four years later Witold Rybczynski and professor and real estate professional 
Peter Linneman introduced an expanded argument about shrinking cities. Their 1999 
article in the public policy journal Public Interest “How to save our shrinking cities,” 
argued that population loss is not always bad for cities if through the planning process 
these cities are redesigned as both smaller and better places to live.46 Their argument 
begins with a history of the rise and fall of America’s large industrial cities. They then 
described a distinction between horizontal and vertical cities. Vertical cities, 
developed during the industrial era, have higher densities, mass transportation that 
connects suburb to city, and have walkable downtowns and neighborhoods.47 
Horizontal cities, developed after World War II, are designed for cars, have lower 
densities, and more private than public amenities.48 Vertical cities are their concern, 
because these cities are historically older and denser, and thus more adversely affected 
by population loss. They discussed the negative consequences of shrinking, including 
a reduced tax base, reduced density, and the lower quality of urban life. They liken a 
city to a shopping mall, arguing that just as if a mall was losing tenants, one of the 
most logical strategies for the mall owner would be to shrink the size of the mall so 
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that it could be at full occupancy and cover all its costs. Thus, they suggest, a city 
should follow the same model, closing off certain sections so that the city can afford to 
maintain the remaining areas.49 Rybczynski and Linneman suggest regional 
government strategies like annexation, vacant lot strategies such as greening, and 
downzoning, as a few methods of planning for shrinking cities.50  
This piece was a critical contribution to discussions about how to plan for 
“smart decline.” It reintroduced the concept of planning for decline back into planning 
circles that had previously been more focused on planning for growth. The authors 
conclusions that revitalization is nearly impossible once a city has reached a certain 
level of depopulation, and that cities facing these problems cannot “resist the idea of 
downsizing,” were bold declarations.51 The suggestions that Rybczynski and 
Linneman gave for shrinking cities would become critical components of plans like 
Youngstown 2010 less than a decade later.  
In 2008 Joseph Schilling, associate director of the Green Regions Initiative for 
Virginia Tech’s Metropolitan Institute, and Jonathan Logan, design coordinator at the 
Rochester Community Design Center, introduced their ideas for how to rightsize cities 
to effectively implement urban greening programs. In their piece “Greening the rust 
belt: a green infrastructure model for rightsizing American cities,” they argued that 
current planning models cannot deal with urban shrinkage, and that cities should 
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reclaim vacant and abandoned properties for the purpose of demolition. Clearance, 
they argued, then allows for urban greening programs from the creation of parks and 
green spaces, to the potential for job creation in this sector, including the creation of 
renewable energy through lot greening.52   
 The three strategies they suggest for rightsizing cities are “…instituting a 
green infrastructure program and plan;…creating a land bank to manage the right-
sizing effort; and…building community consensus through collaborative 
neighborhood planning.”53 They argued for green infrastructure planning, which could 
take the form of community gardens, pocket parks, and/or storm water management 
sites, because these strategies have the capacity to eliminate blighted lots and 
empower communities to have greater control over land in their neighborhood. They 
suggested the creation of land banks because of their ability to inventory properties for 
either future reuse or demolition, recognizing the local legislation and funding that 
land banks require.54 Finally Schilling and Logan advocated for inclusive community 
planning in order to ensure that rightsizing planning takes into account the needs and 
desires of the people it will effect.55 
In 2011, Justin B. Hollander, professor of Urban and Environmental Policy and 
Planning at Tufts University, and Jeremy Németh, professor of Urban and Regional 
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Planning at the University of Colorado Denver, framed their discussion about planning 
for shrinkage from an equity perspective in order to provide planning professionals a 
guide from which to plan in a more “thoughtful and broad-based manner.”56 In “The 
Bounds of Smart Decline: a foundational theory for planning shrinking cities,” the 
authors defined shrinkage, and then explained how urban shrinkage is an inevitable 
part of the neighborhood life-cycle theory without some level of intervention.57 They 
argued that the dominant practices of planning for smart decline are top-down, 
assumes a blank slate rather than acknowledging the residents who still live in 
“shrinking” neighborhoods, and require that the public does not speak out.58  
The framework they provided was based on their assertion that social justice is 
at the core of all ethical planning discussions.59 There are five tenants to their 
framework for how to plan for smart decline: the planning process “must include and 
explicitly recognize multiple voices;” it “should be political and deliberative in 
nature;” “should provide information that enables citizens to recognize and challenge 
power imbalances and structures of domination;” should “be transparent and value 
different types and sources of information;” and “should be regional in scope, but 
local in control and implementation.”60 This framework is based on what they perceive 
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to be the weaknesses of smart decline planning in practice. They noted that when cities 
are in periods of decline, there are often “few crumbs” to distribute, and the poorest 
communities often suffer the most.61 They suggested that implementing more 
inclusive, bottom-up planning frameworks is the only way to ensure that 
disenfranchised communities do not become victims of rightsizing. 
This sampling of some of the literature on rightsizing policy published in 
planning and policy journals represents some of the perspectives on and strategies for 
rightsizing planning from scholars since 1999. Rybczynski and Linneman suggest that 
shrinking can be good for cities, and suggest several policy strategies to redesign 
places managing decline. Schilling and Logan examine decline from an environmental 
perspective, and provide ways that greening can both improve the ecology of the city 
as well as create jobs in green infrastructure. Hollander and Németh assert that 
concerns about equity should be central to any rightsizing plan. These discussions, 
along with those by dozens of other scholars, have had implications on the design and 
implementation of rightsizing strategies.   
 
Problems with Rightsizing Policy  
Problems with rightsizing were introduced as early as the theory itself. The 
problems first identified with ‘triage’ remain when analyzing the effects rightsizing 
has had on cities. In the 1982 article “Triage as Social Policy,” the first argument 
against triage was that the problems experienced by neighborhoods in decline were not 
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inevitable, but were fostered by specific urban policies. Thus problems created by 
certain policies could be solved by new ones. Another issue noted was that triage was 
responsible for creating many of the problems that have in turn created the need for 
more triage. The loss of jobs and population from the inner city was fundamental to 
this cycle. The authors also mentioned that there is no evidence to support the idea that 
disinvesting in certain areas is a better use of resources than employing other methods 
of distributing resources. They argued that “triage destroys communities just at a time 
when the values of community preservation are being recognized as central to national 
urban policy.”62 The authors expressed their belief that perhaps triage is not even 
necessary, and suggested that the nation is well-equipped to handle the problems of 
city neighborhoods.  
 The most significant argument against triage is that the poor will suffer the 
most from these policies. Despite the cost-effectiveness of the policy for the city, the 
minority poor will suffer most from declining city services and programs.63 This 
concern, first mentioned over thirty years ago, remains true in 2017.  
 Similar arguments against these policies were recently launched by Jason 
Hackworth, professor of planning and geography at the University of Toronto. In his 
report “Demolition as Urban Policy in the Rust Belt,” he raises two major issues with 
rightsizing. The first is that ad hoc demolition has been framed as a small intervention 
as an effort to raise nearby property values, but since 1970, the number of demolitions 
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has exceeded that of the urban renewal period that preceded it. These small 
interventions he suggests have actually had a larger impact on the built environment 
than large-scale, federally funded schemes. Second, although proponents of 
demolition policy argue that demolition has regenerative qualities, demolitions have 
actually made neighborhoods more marginalized.64 
 In support of his first point, Hackworth describes both the factors that led up to 
the period of urban renewal, and what propelled the urban renewal period that he 
distinguishes as occurring between 1950 and 1970. He then describes how economic 
downturns in the early 1970s led to the decline in mass demolition and redevelopment 
projects seen in the previous era of urban policy.65 In general, since 1970 
municipalities have pursued an ad-hoc, building by building demolition strategy. They 
were not necessarily part of a citywide planning scheme, or for redevelopment, with 
Detroit’s Poletown neighborhood, the Hope VI program, and New London 
Connecticut’s waterfront neighborhood as a few notable exceptions.66 In the Poletown 
neighborhood, the City of Detroit controversially exercised its powers of eminent 
domain to demolish the entire area in order to allow General Motors to build an 
assembly plant.67 Through the Hope VI low-income housing program of the 1990s, 
grants supported “selective demolition” of public housing towers and other dilapidated 
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housing to build new low-rise units.68 The case-by-case demolitions have largely been 
the result of code violations, tax foreclosure, arson, or other infractions and have 
mostly taken place in declining, disinvested neighborhoods. Although urban renewal 
clearance has received more attention, particularly among scholars, in part because it 
took place over a shorter period of time and cleared whole blocks as opposed to 
piecemeal properties, the reality is that ad hoc demolitions post-1970 have affected 
more total land area and housing units than urban renewal.69  
 The second major point to Hackworth’s argument—that extensive demolition 
has done more harm to neighborhoods than good—is supported by the study he 
conducted of demolitions in distressed neighborhoods in cities that have lost 
significant population. In his study he examined 269 neighborhoods in 49 shrinking 
cities that have lost more than 50 percent of their housing since 1970.70 He describes 
these areas as Extreme Housing Loss Neighborhoods (EHLN) because the primary 
housing intervention strategy in these areas has been demolition. Hackworth sampled 
all cities across New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Wisconsin that met this criteria, and included St. Louis and Louisville for their 
economic similarities to other cities in the region, but omitted New York City for its 
uniqueness. The EHLNs were compared against moderate housing loss 
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neighborhoods, areas that have lost between 0 and 49.9 percent of their housing since 
1970, and growing neighborhoods that have added housing units, in the same cities.71  
The study also examined the change in housing markets and the change in 
social marginality. In EHL neighborhoods, the owner-occupancy rate was 30.1 
percent, more than half of what it was in growing neighborhoods.72 By 2010 this 
percentage had fallen to 26.9 percent, but so had that of growing neighborhoods.73 
This reveals, however, that there are fewer owner-occupied housing units in EHLNs 
than there were forty years ago. High rates of homeownership are frequently employed 
as a measurement of neighborhood health, so the fact that these neighborhoods have 
less homeowners than they previously did suggest that they are less stable today. In 
1970 the difference between the vacancy rate in EHL and middle loss and growing 
neighborhoods was less than ten percent. By 2010, the vacancy rate in EHL 
neighborhoods had grown by 14.9 percent, and was 15.8 points higher than in growing 
neighborhoods.74  
 In terms of social marginality, Hackworth’s results revealed that EHL 
neighborhoods not only had majority African-American populations to begin with, but 
also became more African-American over the course of forty years. Between 1970 and 
2010 the disparity in household income and unemployment rates also increased 
between EHLNs and growing neighborhoods. In 2010 there was a 16.4 percent gap 
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between growing neighborhoods and EHL neighborhoods in residents who had some 
college education. The results show that neighborhoods that have experienced high 
levels of demolitions have actually become more racially segregated, less educated, 
and poorer.75 
 The results of Hackworth’s study have immediate relevance as applied to 
Project C.O.R.E. in Baltimore. The majority of Project C.O.R.E. demolitions are being 
executed in areas that, based on the city’s 2014 Housing Market Typology Map are 
distressed housing markets. The Housing Market Typology Map was designed to help 
buyers looking for property in Baltimore City to understand where the most desirable 
neighborhoods are (Figure 3.2). Neighborhoods with significant vacancy rates are 
categorized as “Middle Market Stressed” or “Stressed.” While it is unknown whether 
Sandtown-Winchester fits the criteria of an EHLN, it has had a significant amount of 
housing demolition since 1970, something that will only increase through Project 
C.O.R.E. The fact that demolition has led to an increase in vacancy rates in EHL 
neighborhoods suggests that demolition has a destabilizing effect in distressed 
neighborhoods. Project C.O.R.E. demolitions are likely to have a similar effect on 
neighborhoods that are already struggling with high vacancy rates.  
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Figure 3.2.  Baltimore City’s 2014 Housing Market Typology Map. The majority of 
“Middle Market Stressed” and “Stressed” neighborhoods are located on the east and 
west sides of the city. From Baltimore Housing, 2014. 
 
 
 The most significant conclusion of Hackworth’s study is that contrary to 
popular planning rhetoric, in neighborhoods most affected by widespread demolition 
policies, the housing markets have not stabilized, and these communities have become 
more, not less socially isolated than they were in 1970. These facts illustrate that while 
rightsizing has removed visual signs of urban decline and abandonment, it has not 
removed the social and economic problems of shrinking neighborhoods. Hackworth’s 
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study empirically proves some of the concerns previously expressed by scholars and 
other observers.  
 Another problem with rightsizing planning is that it is not an equitable 
solution. This critique is explored by Schilling and Logan in “The bounds of smart 
decline,” where they raise serious questions about the lack of justice in rightsizing. 
They note that areas with the highest vacancy rates tend to be predominately minority, 
low-income neighborhood, and that many of these places still bear the marks of past 
urban renewal efforts. “Any rightsizing strategy raises issues of social equity, as 
residents in neighborhoods with high concentrations of vacant properties are often 
predominantly low-income and people of color.”76 Based on these realities, rightsizing 
planning efforts should be balanced with the long-term goals and needs of the 
communities they will impact. They insist that residents must be involved in any plans 
for relocation, which they deem to be inevitable for declining neighborhoods.77  
 Brent D. Ryan critiques rightsizing from the perspective of what it fails to do 
for the communities impacted by the policy. While large numbers of people had left 
shrinking cities that were subsequently affected by rightsizing policies, substantial 
numbers of people remained in neighborhoods scattered across these cities. These 
remaining residents live in increasingly isolated, impoverished neighborhoods, and 
blight removal has not done anything to improve their circumstances. Widespread 
demolition has not “deliver[ed] prosperity” to cities.78 The majority of shrinking cities, 
                                                 
76 Schilling and Logan, “Greening the Rust Belt,” 453.  
 
77 Ibid., 453.  
 
78 Ryan, Design After Decline, 185.  
  114 
such as Detroit and Buffalo, remain as poor in 2000 as they were in 1970.79 These, and 
cities like them, now have more vacant land and fewer people, but the land is no more 
productive than it was when it had vacant building.80  
  Research suggests that rightsizing policy is far from the ideal solution for 
shrinking cities. Instead of saving cities or revitalizing communities, rightsizing 
policies have a serious negative impact on already vulnerable neighborhoods. While 
practitioners declare with pride the number of vacant properties they have demolished, 
neighborhoods with stressed housing markets become more socially isolated, 
impoverished, and hyper-segregated. The failure of practitioners and city officials to 
make distressed neighborhoods a key consideration in rightsizing planning has turned 
out to be their biggest folly.  
 
Preservation Involvement in Rightsizing  
 As rightsizing spread across the country, historic preservation professionals 
and advocates became increasingly concerned about what effect this policy might have 
on historic resources. Instead of opposing rightsizing policies on principle, however, 
some preservationists have approached the issue by acknowledging that not every 
building can be saved. In response, two major organizations have been created to both 
to educate rightsizing proponents on preservation issues, as well as to consult planning 
agencies on how to best address historic resources in rightsizing strategies.  
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 The Preservation Rightsizing Network is one of these initiatives. Founded in 
2013 by Cara Bertron, this organization brings together historic preservation 
professionals, planners, community development organizations, and others in order to 
address how to “create more livable communities and lay a foundation for the 
revitalization of older and historic cities and neighborhoods.”81 The Rightsizing 
Network lists a number of principles that guide the work that they do, chief among 
them being engaging in planning processes, advocating for the preservation of older, 
historic neighborhoods in legacy cities, engaging community residents, and promoting 
equity and social justice.82 The organization is run by a six-person, rotating volunteer 
leadership board of preservation planning professionals and advocates. In pursuit of its 
goals, the organization seeks to connect practitioners, planners and others to share 
relevant research and best practices, provide a forum to discuss challenges and 
opportunities, and promote tools and mechanisms with which to execute the work of 
preservation in legacy cities.83  
 The Rightsizing Network created the “Action Agenda for Historic Preservation 
in Legacy Cities,” a document that was the result of a roundtable discussion at the 
Legacy Cities Conference held in Cleveland, Ohio in June 2014.84 The Agenda 
includes three main ideas, including shaping a new approach to preservation in legacy 
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cities, adapting preservation tools and policies to meet the needs of legacy cities, and 
supporting place-based collaboration. The majority of the report’s recommendations 
focus on creating ways for practitioners in legacy cities to communicate about best 
practices and tools. Their policy recommendations include using data to improve 
rightsizing practices, creating a “toolkit” for preservation in legacy cites, and 
developing new financing methods for building rehabilitation.85 While for each 
recommendation the authors of the report make suggestions for next steps, they fail to 
provide a framework that describes how to actually achieve the described goals.  
 It is difficult to measure the impact that the Preservation Rightsizing Network 
has had on rightsizing policies across the country, Bertron has made some assessments 
herself of the extent to which cities are incorporating preservation as part of their 
plans. In her 2013 piece titled “Rightsizing Right” in Forum Journal published by the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation, she notes that historic preservation is often 
“plays a small and isolated role” in municipal plans and conferences focused on 
rightsizing.86 A year later in a talk given at the University of the Arts in Philadelphia 
Bertron notes that in the 20 cities with the highest population loss between 1960 and 
2000 that were surveyed to determine how rightsizing was preceding, preservation 
once again played a “negligible” role.87 Bertron continually reiterates the need for 
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preservation to become a more central concern in rightsizing planning, but making that 
a reality has been a challenge. 
 Another preservation organization engaged with rightsizing planning is Place 
Economics, a Washington D.C. based consulting firm led by Donovan Rypkema. 
Members of the firm consult on issues related to real estate and economic 
development, and also analyze the economic impact of historic preservation. One of 
the branches of their services is their Rightsizing Cities Initiative. The Initiative was 
started to create strategies to strengthen neighborhoods engaged in rightsizing policies 
and planning. Bertron was one of the first directors of this program that is now run by 
Emilie Evans. Evans, as mentioned earlier, was in charge of a project to survey of 
18,000 properties in Detroit in response to rightsizing initiatives there. She also serves 
as the Secretary of the Preservation Rightsizing Network.88 
 In September 2013, the Rightsizing Cities Initiative launched their ReLocal 
Pilot Project in Muncie, Indiana. ReLocal is a tool that the Initiative created to 
“provide a data-based framework for tackling vacant and abandoned properties.”89 The 
ReLocal tool uses eight different categories of neighborhood strengths and challenges 
in order to help municipalities make decisions about how to proceed with rightsizing 
initiatives in different areas of the city. The eight categories are as follows:  
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ReLocal Category  What it Measures 
Real Estate  Past disinvestment and prospective reinvestment 
Stability  Population trends and related quality-of-life issues 
Neighborhood character  Sense of place through the built environment  
Walkability  Proximity to community assets and condition of bike-ped 
infrastructure  
Fiscal  Economic costs and contributions of neighborhood elements to City 
Economic Opportunity  Wealth-generating opportunities for residents  
Engagement Resident participation in neighborhood  
Environment  Past land uses, natural resources, and current quality-of-life factors  
90 
These metrics were applied to five neighborhoods in Muncie. For each metric 
the neighborhood received a rating of above average, average, or below average. 
Based on these results, recommendations were made for the future of each 
neighborhood. The main points of the results are to make suggestions about how to 
proceed with planning for residential neighborhoods. For example, in Industry, an 
historically working-class neighborhood, homesteading or other low-density uses were 
suggested because the area has experienced major population loss. East Central, 
however, was described as having stabilizing potential because of the “high 
architectural character, well-maintained buildings, community amenities, and an active 
neighborhood association.”91 The ReLocal tool is designed to provide a variety of 
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recommendations at the parcel level in each neighborhood.92 The idea behind this is 
that it allows local officials to then make decisions about which strategies to employ 
based on funding and other factors related to citywide planning.  
 Five neighborhoods were evaluated in the report, one of which served as the 
benchmark neighborhood by which to evaluate the others. At the end of the report, the 
authors suggest strategies for vacant properties. In areas with the “highest priority for 
retention,” the authors recommend stabilizing and rehabilitating properties and 
conveying them to development corporations. In “low priority for retention” areas, it 
is suggested that vacant properties are demolished and that land is either returned to 
natural landscape, held for future decision, repurposed for community use, or re-
conveyed to neighboring property owners as a side lot. The authors note that these 
strategies should be implemented as a part of strategic city and neighborhood 
planning. Since this report was released, the ReLocal tool has been utilized in other 
cities including Little Rock, Arkansas, and the Walnut Hills neighborhood in 
Cincinnati, Ohio. 
 The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) has also commented 
on rightsizing policies. The Advisory Council is an independent federal agency that 
“promotes the preservation, enhancement, and sustainable use of our nation’s diverse 
historic resources, and advises the President and the Congress on national historic 
preservation policy.”93 In 2011 the Council created the Rightsizing Task Force to 
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investigate policy needs as related to historic preservation in community renewal, 
“provide best practices” to federal, state, and local agencies, and to advocate for 
historic properties in the planning process.94 In order to study rightsizing, the Advisory 
Council enlisted the assistance of PlaceEconomics which developed a survey for them, 
and sent the Task Force on site visits to gather data in five legacy cities determined to 
be a representative sample group: Detroit, Michigan; Saginaw, Michigan; Buffalo, 
New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and Newark, New Jersey.95   
This research culminated in the report “Managing Change: Preservation and 
Rightsizing in America,” released in 2014 to comment on the current role of historic 
preservation in rightsizing planning and to make suggestions for how preservation can 
be better integrated into these conversations. The authors of the report acknowledge 
that “the rightsizing process poses serious threats to the nation’s historic urban 
fabric.”96 Noting that discussions regarding how to plan for shrinking cities should not 
disregard the fact that preservation is a powerful tool for revitalization, the report 
looks specifically at how preservation tools can assist in rightsizing. It also reviews 
federal funding for rightsizing, reviews federal policies that support rightsizing, 
examines how to improve federal program coordination, and describes how to use 
federal funding for local preservation efforts.  
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 The authors of the report arrive at four main goals based on their findings, and 
include suggestions for achieving each. The first goal is to make tools used to support 
historic preservation available to municipalities that are developing and implementing 
rightsizing strategies. To support this goal two of their suggestions are encouraging 
collaboration between national preservation organizations to find the best ways to 
promote the Federal Historic Tax Credit, expand of the Federal Historic Rehabilitation 
Tax Incentive Program to apply to owner-occupied structures.97  
Their next goal is “to better use federal resources and processes to pursue 
preservation-based strategies to address rightsizing in legacy cities.”98 To achieve this 
goal they propose Housing and Urban Development should educate local 
administrators on best practices for reusing vacant properties, and that the ACHP 
should develop web-based platforms for publicizing best practices for using federal 
historic preservation programs in rightsizing planning.99 Their next goal is to support 
collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies so that funding for rightsizing 
policies can be more holistic, considering historic preservation as an option and 
opportunity. To achieve this goal they suggest that ACHP promotes greater 
understanding of preservation strategies at the federal and local levels.100 Finally, they 
propose that “communities to work with multiple partners to resolve the impacts of 
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rightsizing, including local institutions and national foundations and businesses.”101 
For this they suggest that the National Trust for Historic Preservation host a blog that 
documents the impact of rightsizing on historic resources in order to broaden the array 
of stakeholders who have access to such information.102  
The report from the ACHP requires numerous collaborative public-private 
partnerships in order to create a larger exchange between communities, planners, and 
preservationists. All of their goals are grounded in greater education and data sharing 
about rightsizing and its impact on historic resources. They also advocate for more 
channels through which to share this information. Ultimately the ACHP wants 
rightsizing policies nationwide to be better-informed, more comprehensive, and more 
sensitive to their impact on historic resources.  
 Preservation and rightsizing are inherently contradictory practices that have 
entirely different goals. Preservation seeks to conserve historic resources for these 
reasons. Rightsizing planning, on the other hand nearly always includes widespread 
demolition as one of the means to achieve its goal. The involvement of 
preservationists in rightsizing planning seems like an important and positive step for 
the field in order to ensure the protection of historic resources. The reality is though 
that preservation involvement in rightsizing has not only not made a negligible 
difference in rightsizing planning in cities, it has tarnished the principles that 
preservationists hold dear. 
                                                 
101 Managing Change: Rightsizing and Preservation in America” The Advisory Council on Historic 
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Conclusion 
Rightsizing has emerged within the past ten years as one prominent strategy of 
urban policy makers in shrinking cities. A concept that arose from theorists examining 
the state of cities in the late 1970 and early 1980s, rightsizing seeks to boost the 
economy of cities by shrinking the size of their footprints via the built environment. 
However, rightsizing policy making in the United States thus far has done little to 
consider its impact on historic resources, and has done virtually nothing to mitigate the 
effects it will have on predominately low-income minority neighborhoods. These 
areas, which are becoming more socially isolated and disenfranchised are the losers in 
the zero-sum game of rightsizing policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 RIGHTSIZING GETS IT WRONG:  
AN EVALUATION OF PROJECT C.O.R.E. AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
FOR VACANT PROPERTIES IN SANDTOWN-WINCHESTER 
 
On January 5, 2016 Maryland Governor Larry Hogan and Baltimore Mayor 
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake announced Project C.O.R.E., a multimillion dollar 
investment to demolish 4,000 vacant properties over the course of four years. The 
project was announced in front of a block of vacant properties in Sandtown-
Winchester, a symbolic move meant to suggest that city officials were paying attention 
to the neighborhood again.1 Project C.O.R.E. is being executed in two phases. Phase I 
of the project, which has already begun, is the demolition phase. It is funded through 
$75 million investment from the state, and $18.5 million from Baltimore City. The 
Maryland Stadium Authority is the manager of the project, and the Department of 
Housing is responsible for identifying properties to demolish. Phase II, “Revitalization 
Through Redevelopment,” involves the state extracting $600 million from the 
Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development programs towards 
new investment in communities affected by Phase I demolitions.2 
In March 2016, Baltimore Housing and the Maryland Department of Housing 
and Community Development published their demolition plans for the year. They 
                                                 
1 Luke Broadwater and Yvonne Wenger, “Gov. Hogan announces $700M plan to target urban decay in 
Baltimore,” Baltimore Sun, January 5, 2016.  
 
2 “Four Year Plan,” Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, 
http://dhcd.maryland.gov/ProjectCORE/Pages/Plan.aspx. 
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included seventy-five demolition clusters across twenty-nine neighborhoods. Each 
cluster ranged from two to twenty-three buildings, bringing the first phase total to 468 
structures to be demolished. Sandtown-Winchester was one of four neighborhoods that 
had five or more demolition clusters. About half of all the demolition clusters were 
within National Register Historic Districts, including Old West Baltimore.3 The 
current Project C.O.R.E. map for 2017 identifies thirteen demolition clusters in 
Sandtown adding up to thirty-five different parcels where a demolition will occur. The 
majority of these properties are located in the southeast portion of the neighborhood 
on North Arlington and North Stockton close to the Upton and Harlem Park 
neighborhoods.4 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explain more innovative and appropriate 
solutions that can be used to address Sandtown’s vacancy problem. This chapter is 
divided into three main sections. The first is an examination of the history of vacant 
building programs administered by the City of Baltimore over the past forty years. 
Part two is a discussion of why Project C.O.R.E. will have a negative impact on 
Sandtown-Winchester. Part three proposes alternative solutions to the neighborhood’s 
vacant building problem.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Eli Pousson, “What does Project CORE mean for Baltimore’s historic neighborhoods,” Baltimore 
Heritage, April 19, 2016, https://baltimoreheritage.org/preservation/project-core-mean-baltimores-
historic-neighborhoods/#.WJ3yfhIrIxc. 
 
4 “Project C.O.R.E.” Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, 
http://www.dhcd.state.md.us/GIS/Project_CORE_v2/index.html. 
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Review of Baltimore Citywide Vacant Building Strategies 1960-2016 
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as the city faced the problems of having a 
declining population and increasing vacancy rates, the work of rehabilitating vacant 
properties fell on individuals doing the work of informal preservation. One such 
individual was Jane Springer, a member of the Preservation Society of Fell’s Point and 
Federal Hill board of directors who rehabilitated an 1802 rowhouse in the Federal Hill 
neighborhood in 1974.5 Some of these efforts were made possible through city or 
federal urban renewal funds, while others were the work of developers or individuals 
such as Springer who took on rehabilitation projects individually. The historic 
building stock left largely intact in inner-city neighborhoods was one of the 
compelling reasons for early members of the “back to the city” movement in the late 
1970s to move into these places.6  
In 1973 Mayor William D. Schaefer started a city-assisted housing program 
known as urban homesteading, a concept first introduced in Philadelphia in 1968 by 
city council member Joseph E. Coleman.7 Through this program, buyers could 
purchase a house for one dollar, and the city provided up to $37,000 in low-interest 
construction loans. Created as an alternative to urban renewal demolition programs, 
                                                 
5 Helen Henry, “Transformed, a 14-foot wide rowhouse,” Baltimore Sun, March 10, 1974.  
 
6 See Shirley Bradway Laska and Daphne Spain, “Urban Policy and Planning in the Wake of 
Gentrification Anticipating Renovators’ Demands,” Journal of the American Planning Association 45, 
no. 4 (1979): 523-531. 
 
7 Michael A. Tomlan, Historic Preservation: Caring for our Expanding Legacy, (New York: Springer 
International Publishing, 2015), 72.  
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homesteading returned 600 properties to use over the course of a ten-year period. The 
first homesteading project took place in what was then one of the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods—Oldtown in East Baltimore. The city connected buyers with 
contractors, and required that all major work be completed within the span of six 
months. This experiment in urban housing ended up saving hundreds of properties in 
neighborhoods across the city from demolition, and revitalized some areas that were 
declining.8 
By 1980 the city could no longer afford to subsidize construction loans for 
homesteaders in large part because of federal budget cuts. As an alternative to 
homesteading, in 1982 the city launched a new program called Rehab Express. Under 
this program the city sold vacant properties for between $100 and $200, and left the 
responsibility of financing the rehabilitation projects to the owners. Around 300 
people participated in this program, but in part due to lack of financial assistance, only 
64 people were able to complete work on their houses.9 
Citywide demolition policies as the solution to managing excesses of vacant 
properties began in 1993 when Mayor Kurt Schmoke pledged to either rehabilitate or 
tear down 600 vacant buildings in Sandtown-Winchester. Then Housing 
Commissioner Daniel P. Henson III justified the strategy by saying “What I’m hearing 
from the communities is, if they’re given two short-term options—a vacant house or a 
                                                 
8 Michael Decourcy Hinds, “Baltimore’s Story of City Homesteading,” New York Times, January 16, 
1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/16/garden/baltimore-s-story-of-city-
homestaeding.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
9 Ibid.  
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vacant lot,—they’ll take the latter every day...When I lay out the criteria and ask them 
to work with us on a selective demolition plan, they’re saying, ‘It’s like you’re 
throwing us a lifeline.’”10 In the end the city demolished 2,500 properties, but was 
criticized for the strategies it employed including mid-block demolition and destroying 
dilapidated public housing without replacing any of the units.11 
 In response to citizen feedback, in 1999 the Baltimore City Council passed an 
ordinance to limit the number of demolitions. Since demolition had become so 
rampant in the 1990s, residents began complaining about the poor communication 
between the city and the neighborhoods regarding when demolitions were to occur. 
Some said they would wake up to the sound of bulldozers with demolition crews on 
their street without any advance notice. They were also upset with the number of 
public housing units that were being torn down when at the time demand for public 
housing was high.12 
 Mayor Martin O’Malley announced an initiative called “Project 5000,” in 
2002. The program was designed to help the city acquire 5,000 vacant properties in 
two years. O’Malley described these properties as “dead capital,” and argued that the 
city should acquire these structures from absentee owners. O’Malley argued that after 
                                                 
10 Eli Pousson, “Baltimore’s Vacant Housing: A Short History of Demolition Policy,” accessed 
February 3, 2017, https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1iJlcj8-
9zR4Q3v8FcG4tUB9xqwHzbJaEpkkydnNe3WM&font=Default&lang=en&initial_zoom=2&height=65
0.  
 
11 Natalie Sherman, “New Program aimed at old Baltimore vacants problem gets slow start,” Baltimore 
Sun, September 24, 2016.  
 
12 Gerard Shields, “City seeks to raze repaired housing,” Baltimore Sun, November 6, 1998.  
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the city owned these properties, the government would be able to guide their future, 
whether that would end up being through resale, demolition, or development.13  
 The city developed several several different property information management 
tools to support this process. These included a repository of property-based 
information, HousingView, an internal web visualization tool to answer property 
inquiries, tracking systems of legal procedures regarding properties, and a complaint 
tracking system.14 These processes also helped to support the property disposition 
system that allowed the city to sell properties to be reused.   
 One such property disposition method was Project Selling City Owned 
Properties Efficiently, or Project SCOPE. Created through a collaboration between the 
Baltimore Efficiency and Economy Foundation (BEEF),  and the Greater Baltimore 
Board of Realtors (GBBR) the initiative gave real estate agents the license to sell city-
owned properties that were taken from absentee landlords.15 The goal of the project 
was to streamline the process of buying city-owned vacant structures.16 The difference 
between this program and Project 5000 was that SCOPE was intended to benefit 
properties and neighborhoods in which the real estate market was still thriving.  
                                                 
13 Gerard Shields, “City seeks to raze repaired housing,” Baltimore Sun, November 6, 1998. 
 
14 William Ballard and G. Thomas Kingsley, “Systems to Improve the Management of city-owned land 
in Baltimore,” Urban Institute and Location Age, 2007, 6, 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411866-Systems-to-Improve-the-
Management-of-City-Owned-Land-in-Baltimore.PDF.  
 
15 Jen DeGregorio, “Some claim Baltimore’s SCOPE program not living up to promise,” Daily Record 
(Baltimore, MD), November 8, 2005.  
 
16 “Economic Impact of Project SCOPE,” Urban Information Associates Inc., June 2006, 2, 
http://www.beefbaltimore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/BEEF_SCOPE_ImpactReport_2006.pdf.  
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 Project SCOPE fell short of expectations. Over the course of eight years, only 
130 properties were rehabilitated.17 The project took nearly three years to get started, 
and once it did, buyers had to wait 180 days to purchase a property.18 Some of those 
who did purchase a property through SCOPE found the 18-month deadline for 
completing renovation work on a building restrictive, and for some impossible to 
meet.19 While property tax revenues from SCOPE-sold properties did rise over the 
course of the program, these revenues took a large hit after the housing bubble burst.20 
 In 2007 Mayor Sheila Dixon called for the creation of a citywide land bank. A 
strategy that had already been employed in places such as Flint, Michigan, this was 
seen as a less controversial strategy than SCOPE and Project 5000, both of which had 
been met with harsh criticism because of who they were designed to benefit, and how 
the process for each had stalled. One of the reasons that the land bank was never 
introduced to city council, however, was that the scheme Dixon had in mind indicated 
the sale of land would not go through approval by the Board of Estimates, making the 
process a less transparent way to manage land. Another issue was that some council 
members felt as though they would no longer have the same authority over their own 
                                                 
17 Andrew Zaleski, “Build it back: inside Baltimore’s quest to rehab blocks of vacant housing,” Curbed, 
November 30, 2016, http://www.curbed.com/2016/11/30/13769138/baltimore-vacants-to-value. 
 
18 “House by House,” Baltimore Sun, March 14, 2005. 
 
19 Eric Siegel, “Slow pace of renovations hurts house-selling program,” Baltimore Sun, October 19, 
2006.  
 
20 “Economic Impact of Project SCOPE,” Urban Information Associates Inc., June 2006, 15, 
http://www.beefbaltimore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/BEEF_SCOPE_ImpactReport_2006.pdf.  
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districts.21 Dixon left office before finding a way to successfully implement these 
ideas, and the scheme lost support.  
 The most recent vacant building initiative is Vacants to Value. Launched by 
Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake in 2010, this program was intended to streamline 
the process of selling vacant city property, and provide incentives for homebuyers and 
developers to invest. The project targeted vacant buildings in the city’s middle-market 
neighborhoods based on Baltimore’s 2014 Housing Market Typology Map (Figure 
3.2). One of the goals of the program was to create a system that made it possible for 
the city to identify and contact property owners of dilapidated structures in 
neighborhoods with declining property values.22 The focus of the investment in 
neighborhoods with stressed housing markets was to either find developers to 
rehabilitate whole blocks, or to raze entire blocks that were deemed to not be 
candidates for new investment. 
 This program has been successful at spurring revitalization in some 
neighborhoods that have declining housing markets. In the Oliver neighborhood on the 
east side of the city, and the Greenmount West neighborhood north of downtown, 
dozens of vacant rowhouses have been rehabilitated and sold.23 Another success of the 
program has been an increase in receivership, one of several tools for managing vacant 
                                                 
21 Andrew Thompson, “What Philly should have learned from Baltimore about land banks,” 
Philadelphia Magazine, December 11, 2013, http://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/12/11/darrell-
clarke-baltimore-land-bank/.  
 
22 Joan Jacobson, “Vacants to Value: Baltimore’s bold blight-elimination effort is making modest 
progress despite limited renovation funds and questionable accounting,” The Abell Report 28, no. 5 
(2015): 2-3. 
 
23 Carrie Wells, “Five years in, Vacants to Value shows mixed results,” Baltimore Sun, November 12, 
2015. 
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properties. Through receivership, the city asks the court to seize property from 
absentee property owners, and in turn gives the property to a non-profit organization 
that then sells it at auction. Through Vacants to Value, 448 properties had either been 
rehabilitated through receivership or restored by property owners worried about the 
threat of receivership by 2015.24 The city has received awards for the program, 
including an Honorable Mention at the 2011 U.S. Conference of Mayors’ for City 
Livability, and the Clinton Global Initiative Commitment to Action award for 
demolishing and rehabilitating 3,000 properties over three years.25 
 Vacants to Value, like the programs that have preceded it, has had its 
shortcomings. The program, while primarily focused on the rehabilitation of vacant 
properties, has also included “blight elimination” through significant demolition. Over 
the course of the program, however, Baltimore City ended up with more vacant 
properties than when Rawlings-Blake’s tenure began.26 This illustrates that neither the 
accelerated demolition nor rehabilitation programs have kept up with the pace that 
properties become vacant. Some property owners have claimed that the city has used 
heavy-handed tactics to seize properties, including designating buildings undergoing 
renovation as vacant. Leonard Abreu was completing renovation work on his house in 
the neighborhood of Canton, when the city seized his property, claiming that it was 
operating as an open-air drug market. Dozens have echoed the sentiment that the 
                                                 
24 Carrie Wells, “Five years in, Vacants to Value shows mixed results,” Baltimore Sun, November 12, 
2015.  
 
25 “V2V Recognition and Awards,” Baltimore Housing, accessed January 19, 2017, 
http://www.vacantstovalue.org/Awards.aspx.  
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combination of the city’s short time frame for code compliance and its tactics of 
seizing property from owners have resulted in residents unfairly losing properties. City 
Housing Assistant Commissioner Jason Hessler has admitted that the city has been 
aggressive on tracking down vacant properties, but has also noted that they “expect 
people to take care of their properties.”27 Another criticism of the project was that it 
neglected buildings in predominately African-American neighborhoods of the city.28  
The city has not been transparent in reporting data from Vacants to Value, 
which has made it difficult to evaluate the success of the program. In a report 
published by the Abell Foundation, researchers found large discrepancies between the 
number of purchases and renovations listed as a result of the program, and what the 
results have actually been. Although the city claimed that the program led to the 
completion of 1,585 projects in its first four years, the Abell Foundation found that 
416 of those properties received building permits before the program began.29 They 
also discovered that almost 300 houses listed as part of the program were actually 
properties purchased by investors on the private market.30 The amount of self-inflation 
in Vacants to Values makes it more difficult to evaluate how many properties it 
actually affected.  
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Another criticism of the program is that it was designed to benefit specific 
areas of the city, and did not include some of the neighborhood with the most need. 
Vacants to Value was specifically designed to benefit middle housing markets, and did 
not incentivize the purchase of vacant properties in neighborhoods with distressed 
housing markets. City council member Bill Henry described Vacants to Value as a 
“cherry picker,” noting “it’s deliberately identifying those vacant houses of having the 
best chance of getting back onto the tax roll.”31 The program excluded 12,000 vacant 
properties that exist in the most distressed housing markets in the city.32 In 
neighborhoods such as Sandtown demolition was an option that took money away 
from potential rehabbers by diverting thousands of dollars to demolition.  
 In September 2016, Vacants to Value exhausted its grant funding only two 
months into the fiscal year. The grant fund suffered from drastic cuts in the latest city 
budget.33 In past years the Baltimore Homeownership Incentive Program had an 
annual budget of $3.3 million. When cuts were made, the program only received $2.1 
million, bringing funding for Vacants to Value $300,000. This meant that the program 
could only administer thirty grants for the fiscal year. The impact of this is that not as 
many people will be able to purchase a house through the program since many use the 
                                                 
31 Andrew Zaleski, “Build it back: Inside Baltimore’s quest to rehab blocks of vacant housing,” Curbed, 
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funds for down payments and closing costs.34 The rate at which the funding ran out 
indicates that there is a strong desire for vacant properties in certain areas of the city.  
 The introduction of Project C.O.R.E. represents the shift from demolition 
being in urban policy to demolition being urban policy in Baltimore.35 The stated 
goals of Project C.O.R.E. are “to support community growth in Baltimore City, to 
eliminate in a strategic manner as many full blocks of blight as possible, and to 
encourage investment in Project C.O.R.E. communities through attractive financing 
and other incentives.”36 Creators of the initiative claim that they will include 
community engagement, workforce development, and historic preservation as part of 
the strategy and execution of the work. The state also claims that the initiative will 
engage communities in the planning process to discuss workforce training 
opportunities, analyze lots and blocks, and mitigating adverse impacts.37 
 Although Project C.O.R.E. was advertised as though it would have an 
immediate impact on the city’s vacant housing stock, the program has gotten off to a 
slow start. Nine months following the announcement, only 53 of the over 370 
properties identified for demolition had been approved to tear down. One of the 
reasons for the slow start to the program is that the city was trying to prevent repeating 
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demolition errors of the past, such as mid-block demolition.38 Officials claim that they 
have been examining best practices for demolishing vacant properties, and looking at 
ways to mitigate negative effects of demolition. One of the mitigation efforts has been 
to reduce dust pollution post-demolition by wetting the site and filling it with clean 
fill. City administrators have also worked to do a better job at notifying neighbors of 
what is going to take place, and salvaging components of the structure that can be 
reused.39 
 These mitigation efforts have escalated the cost of demolitions, however, 
forcing the city to continually reevaluate the scope of the project. For the first twenty-
seven properties that began to be examined in September of 2016, the Maryland 
Stadium Authority, one of the partners of the project, agreed to pay $883,000 for 
demolition costs, which comes to approximately $33,000 per vacant property. This 
overshoots the average cost of demolishing similar properties by $11,000.40  
As Project C.O.R.E. continues under the new mayoral administration of 
Catherine Pugh, it will likely fall short of expectations, not unlike several previous 
demolition and redevelopment initiatives. A major tenant of the project is to demolish 
properties in large enough swaths that the land that is left behind can be redeveloped 
either as green space or through new construction. However, it remains to be seen 
whether anything will be done with these lots. Another important question is, if these 
                                                 
38 Gerard Shields, “Councilman seeks halt to housing demolition,” Baltimore Sun, September 29, 1999.  
 
39 Natalie Sherman, “New Program aimed at old Baltimore vacants problem gets slow start,” Baltimore 
Sun, September 24, 2016.  
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lots are redeveloped, will state money that is supposed to be dedicated to existing 
programs such as low-income housing tax credits be made available to redevelopment 
projects. 
Reaction to Project C.O.R.E. has been decidedly mixed. Some, including 
neighborhood residents, have been enthusiastic about ‘blight removal’ because they do 
not like living in an area with blocks full of vacant properties. Director of the Institute 
for Urban Research at Morgan State University Raymond Winbush questioned what 
kinds of development would eventually come from the project, echoing concerns from 
some city residents that widespread clearance would lead to gentrification. Mark 
Parker, pastor of Breath of God Lutheran Church in the southeast neighborhood of 
Highlandtown reacted with skepticism, noting that “Yes, we need to deal with vacant 
properties, but blighted properties don’t cause the deterioration of the 
neighborhood.”41 For Deborah Sherman, who grew up on North Chester Street, seeing 
the house she grew up in be demolished was bittersweet. Despite the sorrow of seeing 
a place so important to her disappear, she expressed optimism about Project C.O.R.E., 
remarking “This neighborhood will be revitalized like it was when I was growing up 
and even better. That’s my hope…and that’s my prayer.”42 Some West Baltimore 
residents have also expressed the concern that while they want development, they are 
not receiving it in the way they had hoped. This is summed up by Eli Pousson, 
                                                 
41 Fern Shen, “Smashing Sandtown-Winchester to save it?” Baltimore Brew, January 6, 2016, accessed 
March 27, 2017, https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2016/01/06/smashing-sandtown-winchester-to-save-
it/. 
 
42 Brian Kuebler, “State demolishes city block in east Baltimore through Project C.O.R.E.,” WMAR 
Baltimore, February 10, 2017, accessed April 24, 2017, 
http://www.abc2news.com/news/region/baltimore-city/state-demolishes-city-block-in-east-baltimore-
through-project-core.  
  138 
Director of Preservation and Outreach for Baltimore Heritage, who said “Speaking 
broadly, I think that there is substantial support for demolition among resident leaders 
in many of the neighborhoods where demolition is taking place, although I think that 
there is also a great deal of frustration that what West Baltimore needed was a 
significant investment in public transportation, and what it’s getting is significant 
investment in demolition.”43 
 All of Baltimore’s strategies so far have been focused on how to most quickly, 
economically, and efficiently deal with vacant properties. Most strategies have 
included a both rehabilitation and demolition. Despite all of these programs, over fifty 
years the number of vacant buildings in the city has continued to increase. However 
well-intentioned or executed, the programs have not been able to stem population loss, 
in part because the conditions of many neighborhoods on the east and west sides of the 
city have not improved. The city has failed to include any of its demolition plans in a 
long-term comprehensive plan to guide its future.  
 
The Effect of Project C.O.R.E. on Sandtown-Winchester 
 Immediately following the announcement of Project C.O.R.E., the entire 1000 
block of North Stricker Street that served as the backdrop to Governor Hogan and 
Mayor Rawlings-Blake’s speeches in Sandtown-Winchester was demolished.44 In the 
rest of the neighborhood, properties demolished through Phase I of Project C.O.R.E. in 
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2016 were clustered on North Calhoun Street, the intersection of North Mount and 
Mosher Streets, and the intersection of North Stockton and Baker Streets. A map of 
these properties created by Baltimore Housing, identified at least nine other 
demolition clusters funded separately from Project C.O.R.E.45  
 
 
Illustration 4.1. Demolition of vacant rowhouses on North Stricker Street on January 
5, 2016. Photograph by Amy Davis for The Baltimore Sun. 
 
 Project C.O.R.E. is a harmful public policy, both for Baltimore, and more 
specifically for Sandtown-Winchester. By design, the plan concentrates demolition 
clusters in predominantly African-American neighborhoods. In Baltimore City the 
neighborhoods that have the highest levels of vacant properties also have the highest 
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percent of African-American residents.46 Sandtown is 96.6 percent African-American 
and the 72-square-blocks of the neighborhood have approximately 848 vacant 
buildings and 767 vacant lots.47 In the majority African-American neighborhood 
Broadway East neighborhood in East Baltimore, there are over 1,000 vacant 
properties. Proportionally, since more vacant buildings are in minority neighborhoods, 
it follows that more properties will be demolished in these neighborhoods. This is 
proven by the fact that for Phase I of Project C.O.R.E., there were five demolition 
clusters of one or more properties in Sandtown-Winchester, and thirteen in Broadway 
East, whereas the predominantly white areas of Fell’s Point and Federal Hill do not 
have any proposed demolitions.48 As noted by Eli Pousson at Baltimore Heritage, 
looking at the issue historically, it is impossible not to see race as a contributor to the 
issue of vacancy.  
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Figure 4.1. Baltimore City’s 2014 Housing Market Typology Map overlaid with 
Racial Demographic Statistics from the 2015 American Community Survey. Map by 
Paige Barnum, March 2017. 
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Figure 4.2. Map depicting racial distribution in Baltimore City overlaid with percent 
vacant housing units. Map by Paige Barnum, March 2017.  
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Plans for Project C.O.R.E. have thus far shown little regard for historic 
resources. Sandtown-Winchester is part of the Old West Baltimore Historic District 
listed on the National Register of Historic Places. This means that aside from 
buildings in the neighborhood that are non-contributing structures, the resources 
threatened with demolition are historic. Not only that, these historic resources 
represent the history of thousands of African-Americans who have lived in the 
neighborhood since blacks began moving there in the early 20th century. This rich and 
vibrant history, chronicled in the nomination form and in many other works discussing 
the history of Baltimore, does not come to the forefront as a concern in Project 
C.O.R.E. As noted by professor of urban studies Stephanie Ryberg-Webster,  
 
Mallach and Brachman’s (2013) three types of legacy city 
neighborhoods, for example, illustrate the lack of heritage values in 
urban policy making as the location of historic resources certainly do not 
neatly align with ‘‘core,’’ ‘‘intact,’’ and ‘‘disinvested’’ areas. Rather, 
due to the long and complex intertwining of race and class in US cities, 
there is the potential that disinvested areas are disproportionately 
minority and/or low-income communities and unfettered demolition in 
these neighborhoods could lead to the erasure of important, if not 
architecturally astounding, heritage resources.49  
 
Ryberg-Webster is referring to the “three distinct area types” of legacy 
cities described by Mallach and Brachman, who use these distinctions to help 
explain ways to address the housing stock in these different neighborhoods. As 
she notes, this model is biased towards the preservation of more stable, 
wealthier neighborhoods, and disadvantages poorer, more distressed areas. 
Although Sandtown-Winchester is a wealth of historic resources, like Sharon 
                                                 
49 Stephanie Ryberg-Webster and Kelly L. Kinahan, “Historic Preservation and Urban Revitalization in 
the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Planning Literature 29 no. 2 (2014): 131.  
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Baptist Church and rowhouses dating from the 19th century, not all of these 
resources were consideration valuable by those who designed Project C.O.R.E.  
Project C.O.R.E. will also be harmful to Sandtown because widespread 
demolition will not do anything to improve the conditions of the neighborhood in the 
long-run. Sandtown has experienced a myriad of different neighborhood revitalization 
projects that have included everything from affordable housing redevelopment, to job 
programs, to demolition schemes. During the 1990s the neighborhood served as an 
experimental testing ground for Rouse’s neighborhood transformation theory. Some of 
the programs introduced had some positive benefits, like loan programs that allowed 
low-income residents to purchase their first home in the neighborhood. Widespread 
demolition is not a program that can count any of these successes. In Sandtown, 
demolitions have resulted in over strewn lots rising up between occupied structures. 
Many vacant lots throughout the neighborhood now serve as dumping grounds for 
trash that the city does not pick up. These lots do not get redeveloped, they get left 
behind. Proponents of widespread demolition argue for the benefits of “blight” 
elimination, including ridding an area of eyesore properties, while frequently not 
replacing vacant properties with anything but a vacant lot. Replacing blight with blight 
is a zero-sum game for Sandtown. If blight is a cancer to urban neighborhoods, 
demolition is not the automatic cure.  
Demolition is the easy solution for policy makers because it does not have to 
respond to any of the complex questions around urban decay and abandonment that 
created the vacant properties in the first place. Instead of answering any of these 
questions, or solving neighborhood problems, demolition only creates more questions, 
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like what the future of a cleared neighborhood will be and who gets to decide. 
Demolition-only policies are short-sighted because they fail to consider the potential 
for reuse that vacant properties have. But vacant buildings have tremendous value, 
from an environmental, economic, and often historic point of view. A problem as 
complex as how to manage thousands of vacant properties deserves solutions that are 
equally as intricate, and that address more than just how a neighborhood visually 
appears. 
 
Alternative Strategies for Managing Vacant Properties in Sandtown-Winchester  
While widespread demolition is not the appropriate answer to Baltimore’s 
problem of vacant properties, there are a myriad of other solutions that take a more 
comprehensive and critical approach. When demolition is the last as opposed to the 
first solution for neighborhood revitalization, a host of other, more innovative 
approaches are able to come to the fore. These include preservation-specific strategies 
such as mothballing, as well broader neighborhood planning strategies like community 
land trusts. In order for Baltimore to create more vibrant and viable neighborhoods, a 
variety of strategies will have to be employed in tandem. If the $93 million devoted to 
Project C.O.R.E. was instead diverted to a diverse array of revitalization and 
preservation strategies, Baltimore could avoid the negative consequences of 
rightsizing.  
1) Preserving Vacant Buildings for Future Use  
 The most essential part of preserving vacant buildings is the physical 
protection of the resources. No vacant or abandoned building can be put back to use if 
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the building materials are left to decay. The primary solution for managing vacant and 
abandoned properties is mothballing. Mothballing is the process by which vacant 
properties are closed up and secured to be protected from the elements as well as 
vandalism and decay.50 While properties can be mothballed for the short-term, 
buildings in Sandtown-Winchester will need to be mothballed for the long-term. 
Proper mothballing procedures can secure a building for up to ten years. This process 
includes three primary steps, including documentation, stabilization, and 
mothballing.51  
In order to mothball correctly, the first step is to document the historic and 
architectural significance and provide a conditions assessment of the building. This 
work can be undertaken by an architectural historian or other preservation 
professional. The next step in the process, stabilization, begins with exterminating and 
controlling pests that may have infiltrated the structure. The building then needs to be 
secured structurally, which can include processes such as shoring up the roof, and 
installing bracing beams. Then the structure needs to have exterior protection from 
moisture penetration. The process of mothballing includes securing the building to 
protect it from damage that could be cause from vandalism and break-ins. This 
typically includes securing points of entry to the building. It is important that the 
interior still receives adequate ventilation to protect the materials. The utility and 
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mechanical systems of the buildings should also be modified, which may include 
cutting off electrical and telephone lines.52  
The process of mothballing properties in Sandtown-Winchester is a process 
that could encourage collaboration between different organizations in the city, as well 
as provide employment for neighborhood residents. If neighborhood organizations 
such as The No Boundaries Coalition collaborated with Baltimore Heritage and 
Habitat for Humanity of the Chesapeake, the organizations could create a mothballing 
plan that combined local knowledge and experience of neighborhood residents with 
preservation and housing knowledge. The model for this comes from Cincinnati where 
the city’s Historic Stabilization of Structures (SOS) program uses a modest budget to 
stabilize historic properties that do not currently have an investor.53 This program was 
replicated by the Hamilton County Land Reutilization (Land Bank), which dedicates 
200,000 dollars to stabilizing historic properties obtained by the land bank. The land 
bank identifies historic properties to preserve by rating them based on “architectural 
significance, its contribution to the immediate surroundings, community support for 
the structure, the likelihood it will soon return to productive use and whether other 
funding can be leveraged.”54 
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In conjunction with a mothballing plan, the City of Baltimore should develop 
and implement a maintenance and monitoring plan to ensure the continued protection 
of secured properties. In many municipalities the responsibility for such work is done 
through a collaboration between several different departments. In Baltimore this work 
could be undertaken through a partnership between Baltimore Housing, who manages 
the receivership process and sale of vacant properties, as well as code enforcement, 
and the Department of Public Works, who is responsible for cleaning and boarding 
vacant properties. If these departments were given additional funding they would be 
able to hire more staff to create an appropriate timeline to monitor vacant properties 
and if necessary, make repairs to mothballed buildings.   
In order to enhance the aesthetic nature of mothballed properties, the city 
should consider using clearboards. One of the latest trends in best practices for 
mothballing, clearboards are polycarbonate or plastic substitutes for plywood often 
employed in mothballing to secure openings to buildings. Last year Fannie Mae 
announced that it would reimburse owners of vacant properties the cost difference of 
clearboarding over plywood. One of the advantages of using clearboarding over 
plywood is that it makes it more difficult to break into the building. Another positive 
aspect of this material is that it makes vacant properties more attractive. The fact that 
it allows for outsiders to see into the property can prevent abandoned properties from 
becoming havens for criminal activity. Coupled with these advantages though is the 
problem that because of its strength, firefighters have to cut through it with an electric 
saw, a process that takes longer than cutting through plywood. Another problem with 
clearboarding is the cost, as it is nearly six times more expensive to use clearboards 
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over plywood.55 This year Ohio became the first state to ban the use of plywood to 
secure vacant properties, and Phoenix became the first city to require the use of 
clearboards on all vacant buildings.56 If applied to vacant properties in Sandtown-
Winchester, clearboarding could improve the appearance of the neighborhood, the 
viability of vacant properties, and potentially detract criminals and vandals from 
abusing abandoned spaces.57 
Preserving vacant structures in Sandtown-Winchester would not only create 
more possibilities for reinvestment, it would preserve the historic urban fabric of the 
city. The work of mothballing vacant buildings could create jobs for residents of these 
neighborhoods as well as create opportunities for future redevelopment of these 
structures.  
2) Community Land Trust  
 One neighborhood grassroots strategy that has enormous potential in Sandtown 
is a community land trust (CLT). Community land trusts are nonprofit corporations 
that collectively own land in a neighborhood for the benefit of community members. It 
is a strategy that guards land from the pressures of the real estate market by ensuring 
that it is never resold. In order to achieve this goal, CLTs “acquire land through 
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purchase or donation with an intention to retain title in perpetuity.”58 CLTs determine 
appropriate uses for the land they purchase, and subsequently lease the land to 
individuals, families, businesses, community organizations, or other groups. Land 
trusts are established in order to make communities stewards of the land to promote 
greening efforts, create locally-owned businesses, create community-supported 
agriculture, permanently affordable housing, and other community-driven enterprises. 
In urban areas, creating and maintaining permanently affordable housing in a 
neighborhood is frequently the primary goal of a land trust.  
 The land trust model in the United States originated in Albany, Georgia in 
1969 by Civil Rights leaders who were looking for ways to secure access to land for 
African-American farmers. Relying on the legal procedures used by the Jewish 
National Fund for gaining land in Israel at the turn of the 20th century, the model they 
created allowed for individuals to hold leases for homesteads, and created cooperative 
leases for farms. The Albany group bought five thousand acres in Georgia, then 
developed and leased it to African-American farmers. This allowed for these people to 
have the right to farm and live affordably in the post-Civil Rights country.59 
 In order to establish a land trust, first an organization or group of individuals 
that want to create a land trust need to incorporate as a nonprofit organization. The 
CLT then has to acquire the capital necessary to buy parcels of land from the city or 
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other owners, which may include relying on public subsidies to cover the cost of the 
purchase. The CLT is then able to establish a long-term ground lease, frequently 99 
years, for the land, and either develop properties on it, or rehabilitate existing 
properties to be sold as affordable housing.60 
The process of a homeowner buying a house through the CLT begins with the 
purchaser obtaining a mortgage. This mortgage goes to pay down the principal on the 
loan, thereby allowing the homeowner to build equity in the improvement on the land. 
The purchaser also pays an annual fee to the CLT that pays for the land that the 
organization is leasing to the homeowner. If and when the owner decides to sell the 
house, the price for the house is set at an affordable rate for the neighborhood based on 
a formula that has previously been agreed upon in the land trust agreement. The 
homeowner can subsequently gain some price appreciation from the housing market, 
and a secure return on their equity, but the house remains affordable for the next buyer 
to purchase.61  
In Baltimore, the first land trust to be established was the Charm City Land 
Trust in 2000. It was formed by a group of community leaders who had a vision of 
preserving land in neighborhoods, and connecting residents to land resources. They 
started working in the north-central community of Woodberry where they helped 
residents establish their own land trust.62 The neighborhood featured a 100-acre forest, 
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50 of which were sold to Loyola University for development despite the Woodberry 
Land Trust’s dissent. Frustrated by this encroachment of the natural landscape by 
development, the Woodberry Land Trust began to focus on protecting the remainder 
of the forest. In order to do this, the Land Trust negotiated agreements to transfer 
parcels of the land from the Departments of Planning and Housing to the Department 
of Recreation & Parks.63 
Ann Sackey, Vice President of the Charm City Land Trust, described that 
while their initial thrust was about greening strategies and managing open spaces in 
the neighborhood, they later incorporated housing development as one of their focal 
initiatives. Around 2007 they became focused on the McElderry neighborhood of East 
Baltimore. Here the group narrowed in on ‘blight elimination,’ because following 
demolitions the remaining vacant lots became dumping grounds for trash. 
Neighborhood residents wanted these spaces to be cleaned up, but they also wanted to 
create green spaces, as the neighborhood previously did not have any. Now, the 
neighborhood has the “Amazing Port Street Sacred Commons,” which features 
community gardens, a prayer labyrinth, and open green space on land where twenty 
vacant buildings were demolished.64  
Thus far the land trust model in Baltimore has primarily been used in places 
where property values are rising, and residents are trying to prevent displacement due 
to rising rents and property values. This same model could have a positive impact on 
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areas that are not receiving high or any level of investment because the core tenant of 
the land trust model is community control. This is important in Sandtown-Winchester 
because so often in the past residents have not had agency over what happened to their 
neighborhood. Having a land trust would begin to allow residents to make decisions 
about how vacant buildings and lots are used without having to include the city. 
Sandtown could use the land trust model to work to create affordable housing, 
something that is desperately needed there. Matt Hill, co-author of the “Community + 
Land + Trust” report by the Baltimore Housing Roundtable and fair housing lawyer, 
describes the question in Sandtown and other similar areas as being how do you direct 
development dollars into these neighborhoods without displacing people. He views 
CLTs as a tool to build community capacity to create a voice for the community in 
development that is not there right now—at least not, in his view, with the capacity to 
create a community plan. As noted by Sandtown resident and community leader 
William Scipio, affordable housing remains a problem in the neighborhood. This 
model could offer a way to create housing that would remain affordable for the 
foreseeable future. 
The land trust model is compatible with Baltimore because of the similarity it 
bears to the ground rent system on which the city was founded. Through the ground 
rent system, one person would own the land, and allow whomever wanted to build on 
that land would pay rent for the land.65 Land trusts allow for residents to own their 
own homes, while the CLT owns the land itself. Through CLTs homeowners are also 
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able to receive a return on equity while being able to afford a house, and subsequently 
pass on an affordable house to someone else should they decide to sell.  
 An additional reason this would be a good course of action for Sandtown is 
that it would help the neighborhood manage vacant lots and other open spaces in the 
neighborhood. Land management is one of the core tenants of the land trust, and those 
who have run successful land trusts in the city could help to teach them about how to 
do so. In Sandtown, hundreds of the total 767 vacant lots have been ‘adopted’ through 
Baltimore Housing’s Adopt-A-Lot Program.66 Some of the adopters include Men of 
Valuable Action (M.O.V.A.), a non-profit organization from New Song Church which 
helps ex-offenders train for jobs and gain leadership skills. The Farm Alliance of 
Baltimore manages the ‘Strength to Love 2’ urban farm on 1.5 acres in the 
neighborhood.67 Having a land trust in the neighborhood would provide more 
opportunities for the community to creatively reuse some of the vacant lots, and would 
allow these organizations to expand their vacant lot management processes.  
 The challenges that Sandtown would face in implementing a community land 
trust would be similar to the ones that Sackey and others faced when working to 
develop the model in McElderry Park. The first is keeping neighbors educated and 
engaged with the process. Neighbors may not initially be aware that they actually 
control what happens to community land. The stakeholders are the ones who make the 
decisions in the model, so engagement is a key component. This would be crucial in 
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Sandtown, a neighborhood of thousands of people, who have seen scores of 
revitalization efforts and community organizations come and go. There would need to 
be committed group of board members from across the neighborhood that would be 
able to bring people together and keep them informed and engaged in the decision-
making process.  
 Another problem that Sackey and other leaders struggled with when starting 
the CLT was maintaining their focus. Greening lots remains the focus of their work, 
but housing has also become part of their list of priorities. The tendency could be to 
become distracted by programs administered by the city government and becoming 
concerned with competing for that money or attention. It is important for the land trust 
to develop a clear focus, whether that is greening, housing, or other causes. Since 
Sandtown has had so many different programs all with different foci, the community 
would have to decide how they want to use the land trust most effectively to their 
advantage. They would have to keep their focus on these main issues.  
In late January 2016, a few weeks following the Project C.O.R.E. 
announcement, the Baltimore Housing Roundtable released a manifesto of their vision 
for fair and equitable development. The Baltimore Housing Roundtable started in 
2013 by the union United Workers, and is a coalition of community leaders who are 
focused on community development. The report, “Community + Land + Trust,” traces 
the history of uneven development in Baltimore City, and critiques the city’s lack of 
affordable housing. The authors of this report are challenging the city to invest in 
projects that provide better opportunities to fair and equitable housing and creates 
developments that do not displace residents. In it the Roundtable asks the city to 
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commit $20 million a year to hire chronically unemployed people to help demolish 
vacant properties, and $20 million a year for rebuilding and renovating properties to 
become permanently affordable housing. They also advocate for community land 
trusts as equitable solutions for creating and maintaining fair and affordable housing in 
neighborhoods.68  
Fair development is a central demand of the Roundtable. Authors Hill and 
Sabonis identify five tenants of fair development: universality, equity, participation, 
transparency, and accountability.69 These principles are meant to ensure that the 
desires of communities remain central to revitalization strategies. They are designed to 
prevent developers from exerting excessive power, money, and influence over 
communities that have significant development pressure. Roundtable members argue 
that the city’s policies of development over the past forty years have represented a 
“trickle-down” mindset, but that job opportunities and wealth have not reached some 
of the poorest communities.70 
One of the described long-term goals of Project C.O.R.E. is that through 
clearing vacant housing, new, affordable and mixed-income housing will be able to be 
developed. Housing Roundtable members, however, question how new housing will 
meet the needs of Baltimore. In the city, one-third of Baltimore families were 
homeless or nearly homeless in 2014. Fifty-three percent of renters and forty percent 
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of homeowners paid more than one-third of their incomes for housing. This means that 
nearly half of all Baltimore residents live in unaffordable housing. Project C.O.R.E. 
leaders have yet to respond to how it will ensure that future development promised to 
come from demolition will be for affordable housing.71 
Another concern of Roundtable leaders is that communities have not and will 
continue to not be involved with the planning process. Residents were not included in 
deciding which properties would be demolished, and have not been included in 
discussions about the future of the vacant lots in the neighborhood. Furthermore, since 
many neighborhoods do not have organizations with the capacity to ensure 
development stays in the community once initial funds run out, they fear these efforts 
will not be sustainable and will not end up benefiting the communities they promise 
to.72 Roundtable members are also concerned that the Project C.O.R.E. plans do not 
respond to broader revitalization plans for neighborhoods.  
While the preservation of existing building stock to create affordable housing 
is a strategy that other land trusts have used, so far this has not been as common in 
Baltimore. However, co-author of “Community + Land + Trust” and attorney Matt 
Hill said that land trusts in the city have looked at using vacant buildings as an option. 
He said that land trusts and groups attempting to establish land trusts are “trying to 
crack both nuts, the vacant issue in their neighborhoods, as well as affordable 
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housing…so obviously scattered site rehab of a significant number of properties is 
something they’re looking at.”  
There are limits to the land trust model, however, and it is not the only way to 
create community capacity and retain affordable housing. Like other community 
revitalization efforts, land trusts can struggle from lack of sustainability if there is not 
continued interest and leadership training. Land trusts can also suffer if they are 
unable to acquire the necessary funding, or if their funding runs out. Although land 
trusts are a successful housing and land management model, they often need to be 
paired with broader neighborhood revitalization strategies. Ann Sackey thinks that the 
city needs as many strategies as it can, and that while land trusts are one model, they 
are not the only way to achieve the goal of creating and maintaining affordable 
housing.  
3) Historic Preservation and Informal Preservation  
 In Sandtown-Winchester there are not any examples of formal methods of 
historic preservation playing an active role in neighborhood revitalization. However, 
historic preservation has an important role to play not only in protecting and utilizing 
the historic resources of the neighborhood, but also in harnessing public history as a 
tool to empower and strengthen the community. In order for preservation to fulfill its 
role as an alternative to widespread demolition in Sandtown-Winchester, there are 
several policy changes that need to be made in the city. Along with these policy 
changes, there are several ways in which methods of informal preservation can be 
supported and advanced, methods through which nonprofits can support public history 
initiatives in the neighborhood.  
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Before Project C.O.R.E. demolition sites were selected, the city should have 
completed a citywide historic resource survey. Although the city has hundreds of 
properties on national and local historic registers, there are bound to be more 
structures and districts that have not yet been designated that should. It was 
irresponsible to create a citywide demolition plan before creating a citywide historic 
preservation plan. Despite this oversight, and given that the time and resources needed 
to complete a citywide survey would make the endeavor particularly costly, the city 
should instead consider completing windshield surveys of historic resources in the 
areas affected by Project C.O.R.E, beginning with the neighborhoods that are 
projected to have the most demolitions take place. While these areas have likely 
already lost significant resources, conducting an historic resource survey would allow 
preservationists and planners a new and broader perspective on what is historic in the 
city and how preservation can be better integrated into future comprehensive planning.  
For preservation to remain viable in a low-income neighborhood like 
Sandtown-Winchester, Baltimore’s historic preservation code should be amended to 
become more flexible. In historic districts under CHAP’s purview, if a building 
owner wants to make exterior changes to his or her building, they have to obtain a 
building permit signed off on by CHAP. This includes the removal, reconstruction or 
alteration of any exterior architectural feature, any change in exterior color, exterior 
excavation, the construction of an exterior building, wall, fence, or other structure, 
and any exterior demolition. In order to undertake any project of these sorts, the 
building owner must first file a permit application, which then is sent to CHAP. 
Based on the request of CHAP, the applicant may be required to submit detailed 
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plans, elevations, and other specifications to the commission. A public hearing may 
or may not be held, and the Commission will issue an Authorization to Proceed if 
they feel that the proposed changes are in keeping with the architectural character of 
the building and the district if located within an historic district.  
While this procedure is relatively standard among historic commissions across 
the country, it presents several obstacles when carried out in a low-income 
neighborhood. The first is that these areas often lack the capital to complete historic 
rehabilitation projects that are in keeping with the strict standards of an historic 
commission. The building permits for projects in historic districts can range from 
$15-50 on top of the costs of actually doing the project, and that can create an undue 
burden on the homeowner completing the work. If a portion of a bracketed cornice of 
a rowhouse for example, were to disintegrate and need replacement, the owner may 
not have either the ability to replace it in kind to historic standards, or the knowledge 
of how to do so. Sandtown-Winchester lacks the kind of engagement with 
preservation professionals and organizations in the city to be able to receive 
assistance on these matters. Strict architectural standards can sometimes be a 
hindrance to historic preservation in low-income neighborhoods.   
The most important reason for altering the preservation standards in Baltimore 
is the urgency with which the resources in Sandtown-Winchester need to be 
preserved. With the threat of demolition eminent, and with the damage that prolonged 
periods of vacancy can cause to a building, rehabilitating and putting them back to 
use is the most pressing need. This leaves little time to ensure that the windows are 
acceptable to historic standards or that the paint color is appropriate.  
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The standards that are used to define historic districts in Baltimore place an 
emphasis on architectural design and integrity. This is for good reason, since these 
concerns have been at the forefront of the historic preservation movement since its 
inception. However, these standards should not override the historic nature of the 
communities they are meant to protect. While the resources in Sandtown-Winchester 
are architecturally exceptional, the reason for preserving Sandtown, as the same with 
any district, is that the neighborhood has an important history to tell. Therefore, tough 
architectural standards should not be the nail in the coffin of an historic district’s 
survival and viability.  
If there is substantial community interest and support for it, Old West 
Baltimore could be nominated to become a locally designated historic district. The 
primary reason for this is that its history is significant to the history of Baltimore city. 
As referenced in the National Register nomination, the district is significant 
architecturally, for community planning and development, and for its African-
American heritage. Since most local designations come about because of the will of 
communities, it would suggest that residents in Sandtown have not sought this 
designation either through not knowing the benefits for doing so, or because they 
decided not to pursue the option for other reasons.  
There would be several benefits to Sandtown and other nearby neighborhoods 
if they area were to become locally designated district. If Old West Baltimore was a 
locally designated Historical and Architectural district, the properties therein would be 
better protected from the threat of demolition because it would be required that the 
buildings be reviewed by CHAP. These kind of protections would ensure that 
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demolitions would be reviewed, ensuring that the whole portrait of the district is taken 
into consideration, and that structures are reviewed in relation to surrounding 
properties. This also means that this area of the city is not held accountable under the 
preservation by neglect ordinance of CHAP regulations.73 Making Old West Baltimore 
a local district would help protect valuable and threatened resources to wanton, 
widespread demolition.  
Residents and organizations in Sandtown-Winchester have been involved in 
what is known as “informal preservation” for decades. Informal preservation refers to 
the process by which historic properties are rehabilitated without standard preservation 
procedures such as landmarking and the use of historic tax credits. Prior to anyone 
considering Sandtown-Winchester as “historic” or of historic value, individuals and 
groups like Habitat for Humanity have been rehabilitating rowhouses and putting them 
back to use. While these projects do not fit the mold of traditional preservation, they 
are important because they allow for the work of rehabilitating and reusing vacant 
properties to continue.  
There are a number of funding sources available to Baltimore communities that 
would allow this kind of informal preservation and community development to 
continue. For starters, Baltimore Housing’s Office of Rehabilitation Services 
administers a number of loan programs to help low and moderate income residents 
make repairs to and weatherize their homes. Loans are given to complete projects such 
as roof repairs, disability accessibility, and structural repairs. These loans may be 
                                                 
73 “Baltimore City Historic Preservation Rules and Regulations,” Commission for Historical and 
Architectural Preservation, Baltimore City Department of Planning, December 8, 2015.  
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deferred or forgiven based on the individual applicant's eligibility. Grants are also 
available to complete weatherization projects.74  
The same funding source that supports Project C.O.R.E. also supports the 
Community Legacy Neighborhood Intervention Program. Local governments and 
community development organizations are eligible to apply for this grant funding that 
supports “investment in older neighborhoods,” and supports revitalization plans in 
designated Sustainable Community Areas.75  
Ideally, projects done on properties in Sandtown-Winchester would be eligible 
for grant funding through the African American Heritage Preservation Program, a 
joint project of the Maryland Historical Trust and the Maryland Commission on 
African American History and Culture. This program administers grants to assist with 
the preservation of buildings, sites, and communities that have related historical and 
cultural importance to the black experience in the state. The grant funding can be 
applied to acquisition, rehabilitation, new construction, and predevelopment costs of 
projects. However this program requires that projects adhere to the Secretary of the 
Interior’s Standards, something that, as noted, not all homeowners are able to do.76 
 Thus far, there has been limited interaction between historic preservation 
professionals and organizations and Sandtown-Winchester. Baltimore Heritage has 
                                                 
74 “Baltimore Housing Application,” Baltimore Housing, accessed February 10, 2017, 
http://static.baltimorehousing.org/pdf/ghsh_app.pdf. 
 
75 “State Revitalization Programs FY2017 Application Guidelines,” Maryland Department of Housing 
and Community Development, 5, 
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76 “African American Heritage Preservation Program Grants for Capital Projects,” Maryland Historical 
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been involved in advocacy efforts in the surrounding neighborhoods of Upton and 
Harlem Park, but not specifically in Sandtown in part because no one in the 
neighborhood has reached out to them.77 Historic preservation has an important role to 
play in this community, however, both through how it can help residents retain the 
built environment, as well as how public history can have a positive effect on 
revitalization efforts. The key to including more historic preservation initiatives in this 
neighborhood is both connecting preservation and neighborhood organizations, as well 
as creating funding opportunities for preservation to remain viable.  
 In response to Project C.O.R.E., Preservation Maryland, the statewide 
nonprofit preservation advocacy organization, and Baltimore Heritage, the citywide 
nonprofit, proposed a mitigation strategy to lessen the impact of demolitions on 
historic rowhouses. The proposal asks that some of the state funds be diverted to 
stabilize historic properties that can be reused, to document buildings that will be 
demolished, and to provide a staff position at each organization, as well as the 
Baltimore Department of Housing and Community Development. One of the 
agreements already made was that 10 percent of C.O.R.E. funding would go to 
mitigating the effect of losing rowhouses in city designated historic districts. The 
funding for survey and documentation for which the alliance is asking for could go to 
                                                 
77 Eli Pousson, in discussion with the author, November 2016.  
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designating more local districts, which could help more neighborhoods preserve their 
heritage.78 
 Historic preservation professionals in Baltimore can also offer other means of 
technical assistance and advice to residents in low-income neighborhoods. One of the 
ways they can do so would be by hosting workshops in the neighborhood on how to 
do things such as weatherize their homes, or how to make repairs to interior or exterior 
elements at an affordable cost. These kinds of programs would be remarkably 
beneficial to lower-income residents who cannot afford to hire someone to make these 
sorts of home improvements, and do not have the resources or the knowledge to do it 
on their own. Funding diverted from Project C.O.R.E. could go towards supporting a 
professional with expertise in technical preservation to perform outreach in low-
income communities.  
 Given the state of the neighborhood today, it is unsurprising that Sandtown is 
undervalued as an area of historic significance. The rowhouses of the neighborhood 
are exceedingly ordinary in comparison to the dozens of other rowhouses in the 
neighborhood, and the decay evident on some of the blocks does not visually suggest 
it is an important place that anyone cares about. There are no historic signs or 
emblems interpreting the neighborhood for visitors. But Sandtown’s cultural and 
architectural history is one of its most important assets, one that is not being leveraged 
                                                 
78 “Baltimore Heritage and Preservation Maryland Propose Mitigation Strategy for State Demolition 
Program,” Preservation Maryland, accessed February 10, 2017, 
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to the extent that it could or should be. Reinterpreting the history of the neighborhood 
would mean confronting some of the more challenging aspects of the city’s history.  
 One of the ways that Sandtown can showcase the important cultural history of 
the area would be through a community-based public history project. The precedent 
for this sort of project in the city is the Baltimore Neighborhood Heritage Project that 
started in 1977. The basis of the project was collecting oral histories in order to 
understand the life experiences of ordinary people. It started in the Highlandtown 
neighborhood at the senior citizens’ center, and in 1979 expanded to five other 
neighborhoods.79 One of the desired goals of the project was to help residents 
“connect their personal histories with broader social processes,” and to encourage 
them to be more involved in community organizing and advocacy.80  Ultimately the 
project led to the production written histories and essays that appeared in Maryland 
Historical Magazine, the picture book Baltimore People: Baltimore Places: A 
Neighborhood Album, and a theater production called Baltimore Voices.81  
This project could experience a welcome revival in Sandtown-Winchester. A 
project of this sort would both contribute to neighborhood pride, as well as help 
cultivate a more positive image of the neighborhood in the minds of those who do not 
live there. As rich a history that Sandtown-Winchester has, its blocks of rowhouses 
cannot tell their own stories. A community-led public history residents would create a 
                                                 
79 Linda Shopes, “Oral History and Community Involvement: The Baltimore Neighborhood Heritage 
Project,” in Presenting the Past: Essays on History and the Public, eds. Susan Porter Benson, Stephen 
Brier, and Roy Rosenzweig (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 253-254. 
 
80 Ibid., 250.  
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space for Sandtown residents to share the stories of their lives and of their 
neighborhood. “Places do not speak; we must speak for them.”82 
 In 2015, Louis Fields, president of the African-American Tourism Council of 
Maryland, began leading the “Freddie Gray Tour of Baltimore.” The tour visited sites 
in Sandtown-Winchester significant to Gray’s life and death, beginning with the New 
Shiloh Baptist Church where his funeral took place. Stops along the tour also included 
the house where Gray lived as a child on North Carey Street, the site of Gray’s arrest, 
the Western police station, and the intersection of the CVS that was burned following 
his death. Fields’ hoped that the tours not only educated people about the 
neighborhood where Gray came from, but also would help to prevent future incidents. 
By doing these tours, Fields’ recognized, and works to make others recognize that 
Gray’s story, and stories like Gray’s have significance, something not everyone 
acknowledges. In the words of Fields’ “Someone like myself has to say, 'Hey city, hey 
city leaders, don't forget about the rest of our city. Don't forget about the Freddie 
Grays,’...We invested heavily in the Inner Harbor. We invested heavily in certain 
communities to make sure you as a tourist, this is what you see. But what about the 
community called Sandtown?”83  
 Sandtown-Winchester constitutes what Max Page calls a “difficult place,” as a 
landscape that has been the site of crime, of disinvestment, and of protest. The nature 
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of its past, however, is one of the reasons preserving it is so important.84 
Understanding and interpreting the complete history of our cities, particularly the 
recent past, is an exercise that will be more meaningful and complete should diverse 
places still physically exist. The preservation of difficult places matters because it 
helps communities confront the challenging stories of the past, something that will 
hopefully prevent them from repeating. The difficult, recent past for Sandtown does 
not begin or end with Freddie Gray, and public commemoration, no matter how formal 
or informal, matters.  
 
Illustration 4.2. Mural on the Gilmor Homes public housing project, the site of Freddie 
Gray’s arrest on April 12, 2015. Photograph by author, November 17, 2016. 
 
                                                 
84 Page, Why Preservation Matters, 154. 
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 While all of these tools and strategies would play an important role in helping 
Sandtown-Winchester, it should be noted that they are not and will not be the only 
thing necessary in order to improve the impoverished conditions of the neighborhood. 
Better management of vacant properties and lots cannot improve schools, give people 
jobs, or tackle drug use. It can, however, both increase neighborhood control of how 
land is managed, as well as increase community pride.  
 
Conclusion  
Project C.O.R.E., an initiative that derives its policies from the principles of 
rightsizing, will ultimately have negative consequences for Baltimore. The project, 
whose only differences from earlier citywide demolition schemes are the scope and 
the price tag, has already and will continue to wreak havoc on the city’s most 
vulnerable neighborhoods. Instead of continuing down this destructive path, the city 
should instead invest the $93 million in alternative strategies to manage vacant 
properties and lots. 
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CONCLUSION 
 As Project C.O.R.E. demolitions have only just begun, it will be impossible to 
evaluate the consequences it will have on Baltimore for some time. But as this thesis 
has suggested, this initiative will likely have long-term negative impacts on the city. 
There are no easy answers to solving the complex problems of managing vacant 
buildings and lots, improving shrinking cities and neighborhoods, addressing urban 
abandonment, neighborhood revitalization, and how to make planning and 
preservation more inclusive and democratic processes. A wrecking ball alone cannot 
save a shrinking city. This thesis has presented substantial evidence to suggest that a 
solution as one-size-fits-all as rightsizing will not solve Baltimore’s problems.  
 As illustrated by the city’s history, Baltimore has consistently struggled with 
issues related to race and racism. Its history also reveals that planning in the city has 
been impacted by this. During the 1990s in the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood it 
appeared as though that things were changing in the city, and that community planning 
through Community Building in Partnership would be an inclusive process that would 
have lasting benefits for the neighborhood. The failure of this initiative to sustain 
change, however, is one of the factors that allowed Sandtown to decline again, 
eventually creating the conditions that some suggest led to Freddie Gray’s arrest and 
subsequent death.  
Through a close examination of the origin of rightsizing theory, its early 
implementation in cities, and a literature review of the topic, the following conclusions 
were made. First, from the beginning of when the theory of rightsizing was suggested 
in the 1970s, it was noted that these policies would disproportionally affect lower-
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income minority communities. Second, based on Jason Hackworth’s groundbreaking 
study of the effect that widespread demolition policies have had on American cities 
since 1970, there is substantial evidence that neighborhoods affected by these policies 
tend to become poorer, less educated, more racially segregated, and have higher 
vacancy rates than they did previously. Third, despite the fact that several scholars, 
most notably Justin B. Hollander and Jeremy Németh, have raised concerns about 
rightsizing planning from an equity perspective, generally research critiquing 
rightsizing policy has not yet significantly impacted planners and politicians who 
continue to implement these policies.  
Just as predicted by the authors of “Triage as Urban Policy” thirty-five years 
ago, Project C.O.R.E. is planned to have a disproportionate impact on predominately 
lower-income, African-American neighborhoods, as the majority of demolition 
clusters are concentrated in these areas. However, if the City of Baltimore was to think 
critically about diverting funding for demolition to preservation, there would be 
opportunities created to preserve the diverse heritage of Sandtown-Winchester and 
reuse its historic resources.  
 From an equity perspective, Project C.O.R.E. raises serious questions about 
how rightsizing policies are planned and executed and who they are designed to 
benefit. Project C.O.R.E. is designed to have the greatest impact on the most racially 
segregated and economically disadvantaged communities in the city. While many of 
these areas have been effected by substantial population loss and abandonment, the 
people who remain in these neighborhoods have no say in what happens to the place 
they call home. Those who are in some of the most privileged and powerful positions 
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in the city are able to reshape the built environment of neighborhoods they need never 
visit or live in. Rightsizing is the least equitable solution for shrinking cities because it 
seeks to erase the image of poverty and disinvestment without actually addressing 
these problems.  
 Instead of obsessing over how to reshape and control the built environment, the 
City of Baltimore should attempt to solve the problems that created the state of the city 
in the first place. Instead of directing millions of dollars to demolition, the city should 
funnel more money into the organizations and initiatives that are improving housing 
conditions, connecting people to jobs, helping to end homelessness, and helping 
people get better access to affordable healthcare. Baltimore should think about how its 
abundance of vacant buildings can actually help the city address some of its more 
challenging problems in the long-run. In this way, the benefits of historic preservation 
have the potential to impact a more diverse cross-section of the population, making it a 
more equitable tool for neighborhood revitalization.  
 
Limitations and Future Work  
 One of the major limitations of this thesis is the limited amount of research and 
literature on how rightsizing policies have affected American cities. Part of the reason 
for this is timing, as there has not been significant enough time to research and analyze 
the effects of this policy. It is also limited in the amount of data available specifically 
linking demolition-only policies and race. The author attempted to make some of these 
connections in Baltimore, but the results were largely specific to Sandtown-
Winchester.  
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 Future work should be done to study the implications of rightsizing policies on 
all different kinds of city spaces. More research is needed to understand how 
widespread demolition policies are affecting neighborhoods of different 
socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic make-ups. The majority of research on rightsizing 
focuses on cities of the northeast and Midwest, but rightsizing patterns in other parts 
of the country should be studied as well. More research is needed to fully understand 
the effect that rightsizing is having on the historic urban fabric of this country.  
 Historic preservation has an important role to play in discussions of rightsizing 
in planning, but thus far preservationists have failed to advocate adequately for 
disinvested communities. It is the responsibility of preservationists to not only stand 
up for a diverse array of resources, but also a diverse array of people and communities. 
Historic preservationists should continue to question rightsizing policies, including the 
assumptions and biases of those who design them. As Max Page so eloquently wrote 
in Why Preservation Matters, “Preservation has to be reconfigured as a social justice 
movement or else it will have lost its moral compass.”85 This is a critical point in the 
history of planning and preservation where preservationists need to advocate for the 
most equitable solution for all.  
 As equity planning becomes more and more central to general planning theory, 
including that of historic preservation, these professionals will have to demand that 
solutions for neighborhoods like Sandtown-Winchester meet higher standards of social 
justice. In the words of preservationist Michael R. Allen “If we are going to help right-
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size cities, we have to realize that cities are collections of people before they are 
collections of buildings—and we are going to have to treat urban neighborhoods as 
something other than the frontiers we seek to intellectually colonize.”86 Solutions 
should not be created for the sake of fulfilling a theory of planning while disregarding 
its effects on human beings. The central concern of planners and preservationists 
should be how the policies they advocate for affect the most vulnerable members of a 
city’s population.   
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